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ABSTRACT 
This Master’s thesis illustrates the process of arrival of REDD+ and the changes 
preparatory activities are producing on representation in indigenous communities in the 
Peruvian Amazon. Based on data gathered in interviews with community members, communal 
authorities, project developers, government authorities, and other relevant actors, I examine 
the reasons by which communities end up engaging in REDD+, the mechanisms for democratic 
participation and representation employed in the process, and the rules and institutions that 
are being created or changed as a result of projects’ activities. The study shows that access to 
economic benefits from carbon sales and land titling are the two main reasons why 
communities engage in REDD+. During the process of negotiation of entry, consent and 
development of the activities, communities employ existing governance structures and 
mechanisms for representation and participation in decision making and benefits that 
reproduce exclusion, inequality and elite capture in some sites where representation is not 
democratic. Under these conditions, the creation of rules for social order and access to 
resources influenced by REDD+ may cause people to lose important assets and freedoms. The 
study shows on what people gain or lose in the process, indicating the need for the 
development of social protections not only to avoid adverse outcomes, but also make positive 
contributions to poverty alleviation. 
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 ABBREVIATIONS AND DEFINITIONS 
Abbreviations 
AIDER Asociación para la Investigación y el Desarrollo Integral (Association for 
Research and Integral Development) 
AIDESEP  Asociación Interétnica de Desarrollo de la Selva Peruana (Interethnic 
Association of the Peruvian Rainforest) 
CI    Conservation International 
C169-ILO  Convention No. 169 of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of the International 
Labor Organization 
DAR Derecho, Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (Law, Environment and Natural 
Resources) 
FENAMAD Federación Nativa del río Madre de Dios y Afluentes (Federation of 
Native Communities of the Madre de Dios River and Tributaries)  
FPIC   Free Prior Informed Consent 
FPP   Forest People’s Programme 
GOREMAD  Regional Government of Madre de Dios 
INRENA Instituto Nacional de Recursos Naturales (National Institute of Natural 
Resources).  
ITTO   International Tropical Timber Trade Organization 
MINAM  Ministerio del Medio Ambiente (Ministry of Environment) 
PDD Project Document Design. The PDD defines the baseline, strategy, and 
merit of a REDD project.  
PES   Payments for Environmental Services 
POA   Annual Operation Plan  
vi 
 
PROCLIM  Programa de Fortalecimiento de Capacidades Nacionales para manejar el 
Impacto del Cambio Climático y la Contaminación del Aire (Programme 
for Fostering National Capacities to Manage the Impact of Climate 
Change and Air Pollution)  
REDD   Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation 
REDD+ Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation and 
enhancement of forest carbon stocks 
RFE   Rainforest Expeditions 
SINAMOS Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Movilización Social (National System for 
the Support of Social Mobilization)  
SPDA  Sociedad Peruana de Derecho Ambiental (Peruvian Society of 
Environmental Law)  
SUNARP Superintendencia Nacional de Registros Públicos (Superintendent of 
Public Registries) 
 
Definitions 
Comunero Registered community member that is over eighteen years of age. The term 
‘comunera’ is used for females.  
Native Community Is a legal term introduced by the Law of Native Communities of 1974 to 
designate a collectivity of indigenous people that hold legal capacity and 
collective property title and user rights over an area of land. For practical 
purposes, I use the words ‘community’ and ‘commune’ to refer to the same 
concept.  
Ribereños Spanish word for “river-side dwellers” to designate non-indigenous individuals 
who settled along waterways in the Peruvian Amazon. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Thirteen million hectares of forests were converted to other uses or lost through natural 
causes each year in the last decade (FAO, 2010). Deforestation is the second leading cause of 
global warming, contributing 15% of anthropogenic global greenhouse emissions (FCPF, 2009). 
In 2007, governments in the UN Climate Convention adopted a new forest and climate regime 
known as Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) and a 
secondary agreement  REDD+, standing for countries' efforts to reduce emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation, and foster conservation, sustainable management of 
forests, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks. REDD programs specialize in the 
disbursement of funds, primarily to pay national governments to reduce deforestation and 
forest carbon emissions in developing countries. REDD has the potential to bring benefits for 
millions of people around the world by helping them to ensure sustained supplies of forest 
products and help improve their livelihoods.   
Currently, REDD strategies and policies are being formulated in more than forty 
countries (Angelsen, 2009). These imply the creation of a broad set of policies that “will affect 
the entire set of rights and institutions” of local forest dependent communities and that will 
launch changes in forest and land tenure rights, local representation, distributional equity, 
access to resources, and the ability to benefit from forest use (RFGI, 2010). These strategies are 
matter of domestic debate between actors involved at the local and national level regarding the 
“economic benefits, cost efficiency, environmental integrity, national sovereignty, fairness and 
social justice and political positioning” of REDD+ (Presket et al., 2008, in Anderson & Zerriffi, 
2011). Although they acknowledge that REDD alone is not enough to address the root causes of 
environmental degradation and poverty, scholars and promoters of REDD have high 
expectations that REDD will improve sustainable forest management and provide individuals 
and communities with opportunities of generating income through the trade of forest products, 
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ecotourism, and participation in carbon markets. Simultaneously, researchers and indigenous 
rights advocates have raised many concerns about REDD+’s social dimensions due to the 
potential significant negative effects for the poor, who are less likely to have a voice and 
leverage in the negotiations, including: elite capture, potential loss of access to land, and 
exclusion from decision making (Presket et al., 2008, in Anderson & Zerriffi, 2011).  
Meanwhile, as REDD+’s architecture is being designed at the national and international 
level, early experiences are taking place on the ground that are building on already existing 
structures, with current laws that are not yet specific for REDD+. This is the case for Peru, 
where rural and indigenous communities inhabiting the forests are entering into contact with 
REDD+ in a still undefined terrain in terms of carbon rights property, consultation processes, 
and benefit sharing mechanisms. Indigenous groups and their representative organizations 
have been trying to understand what REDD+ is and the potential risks it poses to the 
communities. At first, they had a radical anti-REDD+ discourse, fearing that it would have 
devastating impacts, such as excluding them from decision making, taking away their land 
rights, and impoverishing them even more. Over time, their skepticism has become more 
nuanced as the discussion of the need for social safeguards has brought to the table the 
necessity of ensuring that REDD+ will respect people’s rights.  
At the time of framing this investigation of REDD in Peru at the end of 2011, not much 
had been written about early REDD+ experiences in indigenous communities in Peru. On one 
hand, there were negative accounts of a few projects showing little transparency in the process 
of negotiation of entry and consent for REDD projects and one case in which carbon cowboys 
were attempting to swindle communities. On the other hand, private organizations and public 
institutions mainly provided information about the progress of REDD+ at the regional, national, 
and international levels, but not about the pilot experiences on the ground and their effects. I 
am interested in local representation constructed inside and outside the State and how it is 
changing with introduction and implementation of REDD. The lack of scholarship in the effects 
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of early REDD initiatives on the ground in Peru is a gap that needs to be filled in order to 
understand the implications for these communities.  
In this Master’s thesis, I explore the arrival of REDD+’s preparatory activities into two 
native communities of the Peruvian Amazon. Based on interviews during fieldwork with 
community members, non-profit organizations officers, government authorities, researchers, 
and indigenous leaders, I examine the reasons for which communities end up engaging in 
REDD+, the mechanisms for local participation and representation employed in the process, 
and the rules and institutions that are being created or changed as a result of projects’ 
activities. This thesis is a detailed account of how indigenous communities and their customary 
authorities face the arrival of REDD+, and what people actually gain or lose in the process. 
This study shows that the most important reasons that the communities of Infierno and 
Bélgica decided to join REDD projects are for access to the opportunity of securing land, and the 
possible additional economic benefits from carbon sales. Contrary to what the anti-REDD 
discourse appropriated by some groups, land tenure is not at risk in either of the cases 
examined here. Instead, since holding title is a requirement to enter REDD, preparatory 
activities include technical and financial assistance for clearing tenure, which is an important 
incentive for entering REDD.  Expectations in regards to the economic benefits that REDD will 
possibly bring are varied. In general, communities expect that they will improve material 
comfort at the household level, communal infrastructure, and healthcare and education 
services.  
The study shows that participation and decision making in the context of REDD 
implementation are different among the communities, but in all cases are greatly influenced by 
local representative authorities, who are the members of the community council. These local 
authorities concentrate knowledge, power, and resources in order to convince the community 
to support REDD+ or any activity they consider convenient. However, local participation proves 
to be more effective where communal organization is stronger and more experienced. Previous 
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experience in project management (certified timber and ecotourism) provide basis on which 
new benefit sharing arrangements for REDD will be built. In a community where previous 
arrangements are not transparent and do not promote equity, we can expect that REDD will 
reproduce elite capture and exclusion.  
At the advent of REDD, communities have experienced changes in rules and institutions. 
New rules for land allocation and use of the forest have been established by the local 
authorities with the aim of reducing deforestation. These have important implications for the 
economy of the households and their food security. The rules for social order —that establish 
the rights and responsibilities of the community members, the powers and duties of the 
authorities, and procedures for elections, among others— are also changing and severe 
sanctions are imposed over those who do not comply with these rules. In the particular case of 
Bélgica people can be removed from the community and lose their rights to revenues. 
The present study also reveals the lack of involvement of the district governments (also 
called ‘district municipalities’) and the indigenous federation. This absence entails risks to 
communities as they are not backed by elected or customary authorities who could join and 
advise communities as  they  go through processes for sharing information and gaining consent, 
so that their rights are respected, and equitable benefits sharing mechanisms are designed and 
implemented. Otherwise, REDD+ could only reinforce exclusion and inequality.  
Thesis and Theoretical Discussion 
The literature on REDD+ emphasizes that local and indigenous people’s participation 
and representation in REDD processes is essential in order to avoid potential negative effects 
these processes may have on their rights and livelihoods (Angelsen, 2009).  Following 
Przeworski, Stokes, & Manin (1999) I adopt the concept of “democratic representation,” which 
is defined by responsiveness and accountability. Responsiveness is a set of powers and abilities 
that enable authorities to translate local needs and aspirations into policy, so a regime is 
responsive when it adopts policies that are preferred by the people. Responsiveness is also 
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defined by the powers to act on behalf of the people and the ability of the authorities to 
translate signals into policy (Ribot, 2004). In democratic representation, citizens have the ability 
to balance arbitrary actions by their authorities or institutions through the exercise of 
accountability. Thus, accountability is the ability of one body to sanction another in response to 
their actions (Agrawal & Ribot, 1999; Ribot, 2004).  The relation of accountability between 
citizens and leaders is established through an ensemble of sanctions to ensure that policy 
outcomes are consistent with people’s aspirations (Ribot, 2004: 18). It is only when leaders can 
be held accountable by the people that representation is democratic. Local authorities are a 
mechanism of representation if they bring knowledge, needs, and aspirations of the local 
people into public decision-making processes that are translated into policy (Ribot, 2004). 
Accountability employs mechanisms such as elections, public meetings, public reporting, and 
transparency, which ensures that policy outcomes are consistent with local needs and 
aspirations (Ribot, 2004). 
Anderson & Zerriffi define participation in governance as “the ability of local people to 
participate in decision-making with respect to the design and implementation of projects” 
(Anderson & Zerriffi, 2011). Some theorists argue that substantive local participation in binding 
decision-making is important because it enables management effectiveness and equity (Ribot, 
2004) but this is not guaranteed without representation. In regards to REDD+ governance, 
inclusion and participation in new policies promotes trust and acceptance by different actors 
involved, reducing the risks of conflict or failure of REDD+ projects (Forsyth, 2009). Ribot (2011) 
warns us that local people may be engaged in project activities and forums in which their voices 
are heard, but are not necessarily binding for decision making. Often, participation and 
representation are confused, so it is essential to distinguish between the two (Ribot, 2011).  
I argue that due to the rapid advancement of REDD+’s preparatory projects in Peru, 
communities are giving consent without going through an exhaustive processes in which people 
are informed and consulted. Local active participation is reduced to bringing people into project 
activities without them having the ability to influence decision making or without binding 
6 
 
control of the process. Simultaneously, ostensibly representative authorities monopolize 
project knowledge and resources, with the risk of reproducing new forms of exclusion, 
inequality, and elite capture. Focusing on the role of the authorities and the local people at the 
village level, I examine local representation and participation in addition to changes in rules and 
institutions during the process of the arrival of REDD+’s early initiatives in two native 
communities in the Peruvian Amazon. The analysis is driven by the following research 
questions: 
1. Why and how (through what mechanisms) do local people end up engaging with REDD+? 
What are people’s logic, motives, and expectations from REDD?  
2. Who represents the people both in their decision to consent and during the preparatory 
activities? What are the means by which they are represented? Are the authorities 
representative and accountable? To what degree do they represent the population in 
question? 
3. Why and through what mechanisms do local people participate (or not) in preparatory 
activities? Who participates or who is excluded – and to what degree? Do they have control 
over REDD+? Who influences decision-making? 
4. What rules and institutions are being created or changed as a result of REDD activities at the 
village level? Is REDD+ building over already existent governance structures or is it creating 
new ones? Are there changes in institutions or rules of social order and use of the forest 
resources? Are these changes restricting peoples’ access to the resources? 
The next section provides a brief background on the reasons Peru is participating in 
REDD at both the national and local levels. I describe how the national REDD strategy is being 
structured, how projects are taking place at the local level, and to what extent these processes 
converse with each other.  Later, I turn to the definition of “indigenous peoples” and “native 
communities” in order to provide background information about the population in question 
and their institutions.  
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Background 
Peru contains 72 million hectares of tropical rainforest, covering almost 60% of the 
national territory. These highly bio-diverse forests are also rich in valued natural resources such 
as hydrocarbons, minerals, and timber, which are the motor of national economic growth. The 
construction of large infrastructure for oil and gas exploitation, roads, and dams—as well as the 
expansion of the agricultural frontier and illegal extractive activities (logging, mining and coca 
production)—are among the leading causes of deforestation and the main sources of GHG 
emissions in the country (SPDA, 2010).   
The current deforestation rate is unknown. The most updated estimate (using remote 
sensing analysis in 2005) comes from the Map of Deforestation of the Peruvian Amazon of 
2000, made by the Program for Strengthening National Capacity to handle the Impact of 
Climate Change and Air Pollution (PROCLIM). According to this map, Peru lost approximately 
7,173,000 hectares mainly in the Amazon regions of San Martin, Amazonas, and Loreto up until 
the year 2000 (SPDA, 2010; DAR, 2011). The same study asserts that, between 1990 and 2000, 
the deforestation rate was 149,600 hectares per year. Projections of deforestation between 
2010 and 2041 are pessimistic; it is estimated that in thirty-two years, Peru will lose between 
85,000 and 161,000 hectares of rain forest per year (Dourojeanni, Barandiaran, & Dourojeanni, 
2009).  
  Both the presence of a vast and rich area of forests and the collection of practices and 
factors that endanger them are the two main reasons why Peru has a strong potential to 
participate in REDD (SPDA, 2010; DAR, 2011). The Ministry of the Environment (MINAM) is the 
main actor of REDD and represents the country in global discussions and negotiations of REDD1. 
Peru is participating in five of the six international processes (at different intensities) that are 
currently underway for REDD implementation: (1) United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC), (2) Forest Carbon Partnership Facility of the World Bank (FCPF), (3) 
                                                          
1
 DAR (2011) provides a detailed account of the progress Peru has made in REDD negotiations both at the 
international and national level. 
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Program for Forest Investment (FIP) (Peru is a pilot country since 2010), (4) REDD+ Interim 
Partnership (Peru is only an observer since 2011), and (5) the voluntary carbon markets2. The 
sixth process is the UN-REDD, in which Peru does not participate.   
All countries engaged in the construction of REDD at the national level should go 
through three phases: (1) readiness or preparatory, (2) implementation, and (3) payment for 
results. These phases all involve actions at the regional and national level, but only in the third 
phase is the local level included (DAR, 2011). Peru is currently at the readiness phase, which 
consists of enabling capacity building and stakeholder engagement and the construction of a 
national strategy for REDD. Peru’s readiness began in 2008 with the creation of the “Grupo 
REDD+ Peru” – a group of more than forty public and civil society organizations (DAR, 2011). 
Even though participation is free and voluntary, neither forest dwellers and users nor native 
and peasant communities directly participate, as they are only represented by the regional and 
national indigenous federations (CI, 2012). Grupo REDD+ Peru has taken on an advocacy role, 
an advisory role, and an informative role on the national REDD+ process in support of MINAM 
(CI, 2012). In particular, Grupo REDD+ Peru had a crucial role in assisting MINAM in the 
elaboration of the Readiness Preparation Proposal (R-PP) for the FCPF that was approved in 
Vietnam in 2013, in which Peru will receive 3.6 million dollars for the readiness phase. In this 
phase, Grupo REDD+ Peru led the creation of five REDD Regional Roundtables (Mesas 
Regionales)  in Piura, San Martin, Loreto, Cusco, Madre de Dios and Ucayali that aim at 
analyzing specific regional contexts and enabling dialog between all actors involved. All the 
REDD+ Regional Roundtables are conducted by their own Regional Governments, who voice 
local agreements and discussions to the Ministry of Environment in the central government. In 
addition to the Regional Roundtables, the Interethnic Association of the Peruvian Rainforest 
(AIDESEP) and its regional federations created three Indigenous Roundtables (Mesa Indígena) in 
Ucayali, Madre de Dios and San Martin. Their aim is to enhance the participation of indigenous 
communities in the process of REDD.  
                                                          
2
 For detailed information on about each process in relation to Peru, see DAR (2011). 
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While REDD is under construction at the international and national levels, a wide range of initiatives are 
advancing simultaneously at the project level, including demonstration activities, national and 
subnational programs, and bilateral and multilateral agreements (DAR, 2011). There are nearly forty 
REDD related initiatives underway, mostly in the Amazon that are targeted at the voluntary carbon 
market (AIDESEP, 2011; DAR, 2011 and 2012; CI, 2012; Entenmann, 2011). In Peru, these projects can 
take place in native communities, protected areas, or forestry concessions and may directly involve 
asset holders or use intermediaries. Projects are validated by internationally recognized voluntary 
standards such as the Voluntary Carbon Standard (VCS) and the Climate, Community and Biodiversity 
Alliance Standard (CCBA) (DAR, 2011). These projects are being developed under existing laws, in 
absence of a recognized REDD+ mechanism in international and national laws. The experiences gained 
during the course of the project are helping in the readiness or preparatory phase by providing feedback 
through the Regional REDD+ Roundtables for the design of the future national REDD regime. 
In terms of the development of REDD in the Region of Madre de Dios and its connection 
to the national process, there are a total of forty-two public and private institutions and 
organizations participating in the “REDD+ Roundtable of Madre de Dios” (MDD Roundtable) – a  
space created in 2007 by civil society organizations. The Roundtable is led by the Regional 
Government of Madre de Dios (GOREMAD) and is open to any organization or institution who 
wishes to participate. Its main objectives are to develop official deforestation baselines, to 
create REDD+ methods specific to the region, and to address governance and financing matters 
(Hajek et al. 2011; Entenmann, 2012). According to a recent  analysis of the participation of 
stakeholders in REDD+ by Conservation International (2012), there was a lack of participation 
on behalf of the district governments and the indigenous in the MDD Roundtable sessions.  On 
the one hand, District Governments do not have jurisdiction over land and forests. On the other 
hand, indigenous issues were not included in the discussions and were poorly addressed. It is 
expected by Indigenous organizations, project developers and government official that the 
creation of Indigenous REDD Roundtable in Madre de Dios will enhance the participation of 
Indigenous Communities (CI, 2012; Entenmann, 2011; DAR, 2011). 
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When projects are developed at the local level, there may be a great number of actors 
involved—for example, native communities, forest concessions, etc.—and with the Project 
Developer. Interacting with asset holders or project developers requires knowledge, time, and 
resources and can often be overwhelming for some actors, some who work directly in the field 
and others who are in the international arena. In the field, we find non-profit conservation 
organizations, non-profit natural resources management organizations, forestry companies, 
financial consultancy firms, grassroots organizations, and the Peruvian government. In the 
international arena, there is a group of organizations providing services, funds, and acting in the 
role of intermediaries; such is the case of technical consultancies, standards organizations, 
registry organizations, accredited project verifier organizations, information providers, and 
international funding bodies and financers (Hajek et al., 2011). In some cases, the relationships 
between asset holders, project developers, and other intervening institutions may predate 
REDD+’s arrival, providing some advantages for the project developers (Hajek et al., 2011). 
In Madre de Dios, there are currently 13 REDD+ projects underway with different levels 
of completion (CI, 2012). They are called “REDD+ projects” because they prepare communities, 
concessions, or natural protected areas for the future sale of Carbon credits in the voluntary 
market. From a technical point of view, projects need complete three phases3 before being 
finally inserted in REDD to be able to sell carbon credits: (1) identification, (2) feasibility, and (3) 
implementation (Olander & Ebeling, 2011); the process may take several years. During the 
“identification” phase, the project’s potential is analyzed to determine whether or not the 
project will be able to generate carbon credits. This is the phase in which the contact with the 
local stakeholders is established and approval is granted by the rights-holders. In the 
“feasibility” phase, the project practicality is analyzed to produce an ex-ante quantification of 
the project’s carbon benefits; the Project Document Design (PDD) is made and validated 
according to the standards (ONF, 2011). Lastly, during the “implementation” phase, the project 
                                                          
3
 Based on the document “Building Forest Carbon Projects: Step by Step Overview and Guide” developed by Forest 
Trends, Eco Decision, Katoomba Incubator, with the financial support of Bio CF, Norad, UNPD and the Global 
Environment Facility 
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is finally able to generate carbon credits and is enabled for further monitoring and credit 
certification sessions (ONF, 2011; ITTO, 2009). Up until the end of 2012, only one project has 
sold carbon credits4; the rest are either at the identification or the feasibility stage. The cases 
examined in this study are currently in progress in native communities and are in the feasibility 
phase.  These cases are not yet REDD+ projects, however, they are locally named “preparatory 
activities” or “REDD projects.”   
In order to understand the implications of a REDD project for indigenous populations, it 
is essential to define who “indigenous peoples” are and how they became recognized as “native 
communities.” Also, it is important to understand the difficulties they have faced in the process 
of recognition of their collective rights and the process through which indigenous 
representation was constructed inside and outside the State.  Peruvian law defines indigenous 
peoples as tribal groups of families who:  (1) descend from aboriginal populations established 
within the Peruvian territory, (2) have lifestyles and spiritual and historical links to their 
customary territory, (3) have their own traditions and social institutions, and (4) cultural 
patterns and lifestyles different from the rest of the Peruvian nation.5  Indigenous peoples of 
the Amazon6 have progressively lost their ancestral domains and suffered changes in their 
patterns of occupation of the forest, due to a long term process of State-led colonization of the 
jungle that intensified in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Tribal groups used to live in 
scattered family clans moving in the forest until the arrival of missionaries, farmers, extractive 
companies, and migrants who—by pacific or violent means—disrupted their lives and social 
structures (IBC, 2012). Some groups escaped from forced labor, illness, and killings and 
retreated into the forest and headwaters, others were forced to concentrate in small towns to 
be converted into Christians or to serve as labor, and others still formed villages and mixed with 
                                                          
4
  This is the case of the project named “Avoided Deforestation through Sustainable Forest Management via 
Timber Production for FSC” in forestry concessions MADERACRE and MADERYJA. 
5
 Ley de Comunidades Nativas y Promoción Agropecuaria of 1974 [Jungle Law – Law of Native Communities and 
agricultural promotion of 1974]  
6
 There are Indigenous groups in the Andes and in the Peruvian coast too, but for the purpose of this study, I will 
only concentrate in the ones living in the Amazon.  
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the migrants. This process took place over several different waves of occupation and extractive 
booms (gold, oil, rubber, timber, furs, medicinal plants, etc.). 
In the decades of the 1950s and 1960s, State policies intensively incentivized the 
occupation of the lowlands and the establishment of towns, with the aim of alleviating 
demographic pressure in the Andes, accessing land and natural resources, and protecting the 
borders from neighboring countries (Huertas & Altamirano, 2003). One of the strategies the 
central government employed to incorporate indigenous people into the society was the 
expansion of the school system. Starting in 1950, in agreement with the State, the Summer 
Linguistic Institute (ILV) of Peru provided of bilingual education to indigenous groups. ILV 
helped the process of concentrating the population in villages. Several groups formed villages 
to reach the minimum population requirement in order for their children to gain access to 
schools.  Grouping also brought new forms of political organization, authority, and 
representation for the collectivity in their interactions with the State (IBC, 2012; Alexiades, 
1999).  
In 1974, the Revolutionary Military Government of General Velasco Alvarado 
promulgated the Law of Native Communities in 1974 and formalized indigenous villages by 
giving them the status of “Native Communities,” along with legal capacity and collective 
property titles. However, titles only covered small areas of their ancestral territories (IBC, 
2012). Land titles are divided into areas over which title holders have different rights, including 
property rights over agricultural areas and user rights over forest lands. Up until 1978, title 
holders had property rights over all the titled areas, but a change in the law returned forests’ 
property rights to the State – giving communities only user rights. Currently, since the 
competent institutions do not usually have the resources to do its work, many of the titles have 
been obtained with funding from international funding and NGOs.   
The regulations of the Law of Native Communities also included the creation of the 
status of “comunero” for males, and “comunera” for females to designate registered 
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community members that are over eighteen years of age (age of majority in Peru).  The law 
established representative governing bodies such as the Community Council and the 
Community Assembly. Community Councils were introduced as new political structures to 
enable a direct interface with the central government and to facilitate local governance 
(Alexiades, 1999). These councils are composed of one President (also called “chief”), Secretary, 
Treasurer, and two members-at-large. Members of the Council are elected every two years by 
the Community Assembly, the main decision making body, which is composed by all the 
comuneros. The Community Assembly holds Ordinary Meetings on a monthly7 basis with the 
aim of discussing local affairs and the progress of the community. Extraordinary Meetings are 
called when there are urgent matters to discuss.  According to the same law,8 communities 
establish their rules for social order and write them in the “Communal Statutes,” which need to 
be registered in the National Public Registries. The Superintendent of Public Registries 
(SUNARP) requires that these documents include sections for elections, rules for the use of 
resources and land, governance bodies, and their functions (among others). Statutes need to 
comply first with the Law of Native Communities and the Constitution and are then are 
reviewed by SUNARP, which approves or rejects them. In 2011, with the aim of adapting recent 
changes in the laws regarding native communities and to facilitate their registration, SUNARP 
presented a “general template” that communities can use and adapt to their own needs. 
Although the content of the template is not mandatory, the statutes need to comply with the 
current laws referring to indigenous communities. Outside of the governance structure of the 
communities, there are community groups that have been created as a result of projects—such 
as committees of fruit collectors, fishers, artisans, etc.—that represent particular interests. In 
some cases, these groups are large and can be taken as representative of the village as a whole 
(even though they are not) by NGOs, companies or other organizations (Ribot, 2004).  
After the recognition of the native communities, several institutions inside the State 
apparatus were adapted or created to assist land titling and to enable indigenous 
                                                          
7
 This is flexible, communities are free to establish the frequency of their ordinary meetings.  
8
 Law of Native Communities of 1974. 
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representation.  Institutions have been changed, merged, eliminated, and reinvented according 
to the political objectives of the different governmental factions in power (IBC, 2012). During 
the military governments of the 1970s, the National System for Social Mobilization (SINAMOS) 
was in charge of organizing non-indigenous rural populations into cooperatives and indigenous 
settlements into native communities. Land titling in native communities was the responsibility 
of the General Directorate of Agrarian Reform of the Ministry of Agriculture. This Directorate 
was very active until the early 1980s, when it suffered a slowdown resulting from the 
emergence of terrorist groups that took control of the rural areas in the country and resulted in 
many communities not completing the titling process. Land titling responsibilities were 
transferred to the Special Land Titling and Cadastre Project (PETT) in 1992, which operated with 
international funding and resumed land titling processes that were halted in the previous 
decade. In 2007, PETT was absorbed by COFOPRI, which had only been in charge of titling 
property in urban areas.  Later, land tilting responsibilities were returned to the Regional 
Agrarian Directorates assigned to the Regional Governments during the consolidation of the 
decentralization process (IBC, 2012; Abanto, 2011). All of these institutional changes have 
caused a number of problems—such as lost files and interrupted or delayed processes—
because of lack of resources in the titling agencies. Moreover, changes in titling methodologies 
and technology have created conflicts due to inaccuracies and the overlapping of titles.  
Since the early 1980s, indigenous groups and their advocates have demanded a State 
establishment of a public indigenous institution to see to their interests. Similarly to what 
happened with land titling, there has been a constant change of institutions in charge of 
indigenous affairs. In the decade of 1980s the Peruvian Indigenous Institute (IIP),9 attached to 
the Ministry of Labor, became in charge of affairs with regards to land, territories, and 
resources in accordance to the 107th Convention of the International Labor Organization (ILO).10  
                                                          
9
 The IIP was established in 1946. 
10
 According to the International Labor Organization (ILO): “The Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention, 
1957 (No. 107) was a first attempt to codify international obligations of States in respect indigenous and tribal 
populations. It is a broad development instrument, covering a wide range of issues such as land; recruitment and 
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IIP was later transferred to the Ministry of Agriculture, replaced by the Directorate of 
Communities, and further deactivated in 1996 (IBC, 2012). Amazon indigenous federations and 
African-Peruvian and Andean people’s organizations demanded the creation of the Ministry of 
Indigenous Affairs, a high-ranked institution that would enable them to participate in decision 
making and policy design. Instead, the government created a lower-ranked institution called 
the Technical Secretariat of Indigenous Affairs (SETAI), which was later incorporated into the 
National Commission of Andean, Amazon, and Afro-Peruvian Peoples (CONAPA) that was 
attached to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. In 2005, CONAPA was absorbed by the 
newly created National Institute for the Development of Andean, Amazon, and Afro-Peruvian 
Peoples (INDEPA). Finally, INDEPA was absorbed by the Vice Ministry of Intercultural Affairs of 
the newly created of the Ministry of Culture.  After all of these changes, the Vice Ministry of 
Intercultural Affairs is now the national indigenous authority. Moreover, the Vice Ministry is in 
charge of proposing and supervising the compliance of national policies in regards to ethnic 
minorities and to coordinate projects with the Regional Governments that are aimed at the 
promotion and defense of their rights (Abanto, 2011).  
One of the main achievements of the Vice Ministry of Intercultural Affairs is to have 
consolidated the creation of the Law for Free Prior and Informed Consultation of 2011. The 
creation of this law was pending since 1989, when Peru signed the Convention No. 169 of 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of the International Labor Organization (C169-ILO). C169-ILO 
requires signatory countries to create legislation, policies and programs to guarantee that 
indigenous peoples are consulted on issues that affect them, so that they are able to engage in 
free, prior and informed participation in policy and development processes. The recently 
created Law for Free Prior and Informed Consultation of 2011 is aligned to the C169-ILO. 
However, the law is at risk of losing its legitimacy due to a controversy over which people will 
be considered “indigenous” and be included in consultation processes. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
conditions of employment; vocational training, handicrafts and rural industries; social security and health; and 
education and means of communication”  
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Almost thirty-five years of advances and setbacks have not allowed for the development 
of consistent political institutions for the representation of indigenous peoples.  In this process, 
their local federations that began emerging in 1969 were instrumental in pushing forward 
initiatives for voicing indigenous people’s concerns. The Interethnic Association for the 
Development of the Peruvian Amazon (AIDESEP)—the national indigenous federation that 
groups sixty-five organizations, representing approximately 1,500 indigenous communities in 
the country—advocates for the recognition of indigenous territories, respect of their culture 
and traditions, and the implementation of programs to attend their needs.   
Native communities have been a target of many developmental and environmental 
interventions – and REDD+ is one more.  REDD+ will build upon the already existing structures 
and will probably bring changes in rules and institutions. Projects involving native communities 
are increasing in number and are raising concerns about their potential social impacts. 
Discussions on safeguards are starting to take place at the national and regional levels, although 
indigenous organizations still remain strongly skeptical. AIDESEP initially opposed to the 
possibility of REDD+, but altered its position in the last five years. It is now developing a 
proposal for “Indigenous REDD+,” which demands the central government respect international 
conventions that were adopted by Peru, the recognition and respect of collective territories, 
the design of adequate benefit sharing mechanisms, the establishment of national regulations 
on carbon rights, and the establishment of Free Prior Informed Consent (FPIC) consultation 
processes  (Espinoza & Feather, 2011; AIDESEP, 2013). In regards to the latter, FPIC is only 
mandatory in the case of State-led projects (DAR, 2012) and private companies and 
organizations do not have the responsibility of making consultations if they wish to start a 
REDD+ project in a native community. Project proponents approach the communities to offer 
REDD projects and carry out processes though which they negotiate entry and seek consent – 
without supervision by the State.  According to DAR (2012), the State has the obligation to 
protect their citizens by supervising these processes in order to prevent abuse and to work 
quickly in the implementation of such laws. This lack of regulation for REDD+ may open the 
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possibility for unscrupulous organizations or individuals to abuse and exploit rural and 
indigenous peoples, who may end up losing important assets and freedoms.  
Chapter Outline 
This thesis is divided into the following chapters: the second chapter provides the methods 
and data employed in the study and explains the site selection criteria and the limitations of the 
study. The third and fourth chapters are the core of this work. They describe the two case 
studies of the native communities of Bélgica and Infierno in detail by providing the historical 
backgrounds and the institutional landscape at the community level and explaining the process 
of arrival of REDD+. Results are presented in the fifth chapter and are structured around the 
research questions that guide this thesis.  Finally, the sixth chapter is reserved for conclusions. 
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CHAPTER 2  
METHODS AND DATA 
Introduction 
I conducted the research for this study for two months between 15 June and 15 August 
2012 in the region of Madre de Dios, Peru. I used social science methods such as structured and 
unstructured interviews,11 data collection from government and NGO documents, and 
participant observation in public meetings. This investigation is also based in the review of 
academic and grey literature on REDD+ implementation in Peru and literature relevant to the 
economic history of Madre de Dios and the project sites.  I conducted a total of fifty-eight 
interviews, which included five project officers working at the Association for Research and 
Integral Development  (AIDER) – a non-profit organization based in Lima and with a branch 
office in Puerto Maldonado that provides technical assistance to native communities for 
sustainable forest management and is currently developing REDD projects. I also interviewed 
twenty-one comuneros in Bélgica, twenty-three comuneros in Infierno, two government 
officials from the Regional Government of Madre de Dios (GOREMAD), and two representative 
officials of FENAMAD. A total of five informal interviews were conducted with researchers, 
practitioners, and indigenous leaders directly and indirectly involved in REDD+ in Peru.  The 
information obtained from the interlocutors during fieldwork has been kept anonymous.  
In the next sections, I explain the site selection criteria employed in this study, which 
included a description of the main features of both communities. I provide a detailed account 
of my fieldwork activities in the phases of preparation, execution, and conclusion. Finally, I 
reflect on the problems and limitations of the study. 
                                                          
11
 All excerpts from interviews have been translated from their original language by the author (unless otherwise 
indicated). Only the English translations are provided in the text of this thesis. 
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Site Selection Criteria and Basic Description of the Sites  
The universe of REDD+ projects underway in Peru are taking place in three different 
types of sites: natural protected areas, forest concessions, and native communities. For the 
purposes of examining representation and participation in the process of arrival of REDD+, I 
chose to work with native communities. The starting point of my research was the close 
examination of the recent technical reports by non-profit organizations and government 
agencies that provide lists and descriptions—in different degree of detail—of ongoing REDD+ 
projects. The most relevant is a document by Espinoza & Feather (2011). In their article, "The 
Reality of REDD+ in Peru: Between Theory and Practice - Indigenous Amazonian Peoples’ 
Analyses and Alternatives,” the authors provide a selection of cases where REDD+ projects are 
underway in indigenous communities in Peru. Similar to the recent literature that informs the 
risks REDD+ poses to forest dependent communities, “The Reality of REDD+…” makes claims 
about the alleged lack of adequate FPIC processes followed by the project developers, the lack 
of transparency in the terms of the contracts or agreements signed with the communities, and 
the unwillingness of the developers to coordinate actions with representative indigenous 
institutions such as FENAMAD and AIDESEP. Most importantly, the authors denounce possible 
restrictions of the use and access to the territory by the local communities. The report includes 
a list of case studies that encompasses Bélgica and Infierno, both in the region of Madre de 
Dios. 
Infierno is located in the province of Tambopata and is very close to Puerto Maldonado, 
the region capital. Land is communally owned (9,558 hectares) by approximately two hundred 
and three households from three different ethnic backgrounds: Ese Eja, ribereño, and Andean. 
The main subsistence and commercial activities are agriculture, tourism, forest gathering, 
fishing, hunting, and timber harvesting. The community receives limited support from the 
district and regional governments and has a limited infrastructure for education, health, and 
transport.  It is connected to Puerto Maldonado by a precarious 19 km. road that becomes 
difficult to pass during the rainy season. Their lands are threatened by an accelerated process 
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of occupation as a result of the construction of the Inter-oceanic Highway that connects Peru 
and Brazil. Infierno has been engaged in ecotourism since 1996 with great success and hast 
started preparatory activities for REDD+ since 2009.  
Bélgica is located in the province of Tahuamanu, in the northern part of the region on 
the border with Brazil (see Annex B). Land is also communally owned (53,394 hectares) by 
twenty families of Yine origin from both sides of the border. The main subsistence and 
commercial activities are agriculture, cattle ranching, certified timber harvesting, and rubber 
tapping. The community receives even less support from the regional and the district 
governments than Infierno in terms of services and infrastructure. They only have one primary 
school and one medical post (that is often unattended). The road that connects the village to 
Iñapari, the provincial capital, is not in good condition – especially during the rainy season. The 
territory is now under threat of deforestation due to the construction of a new road that will 
connect Tahuamanu and Purus (a locality in the neighboring region). Since 2009, the 
community has had an agreement with a logging company that is harvesting certified timber. 
Bélgica has been trying to engage in REDD+ since 2008.  
The choice for the native communities of Bélgica and Infierno to engage with REDD+ 
was based on several factors: (1) both have the most-advanced REDD+ preparation projects in 
native communities of the Amazon currently developed by the same organization (AIDER), (2) 
both have gone through a process of negotiation of entry and consent in which the local 
authorities have represented the population, (3) both communities have prior experiences in 
community based management of natural resources and the use of benefit sharing 
mechanisms, (4) both aim to selling  carbon in the voluntary market, and (5) both are pilot 
projects. In regards to this last point, there is a difference between both projects. Infierno’s is a 
pilot project developed with funding from the International Timber Organization. In this 
project, the national government has had participation (at least in the site selection and 
negotiation of entry stages.) The logic behind it is that Infierno’s experience will inform the 
creation of policies for REDD+ in Peru. Bélgica’s experience was developed first by a group of 
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investors that funded the activities, with the condition to be paid back by Bélgica with the 
revenues obtained from the sales of the first and second carbon credits (details are explained in 
Chapter 3.)  
One important difference between the two communities is the size of the territory and 
the population. Bélgica holds an extensive territory that is almost five times larger than 
Infierno, and has only about 10% of Infierno’s population. Both communities are also different 
in their historic contexts, their relationship with the resources  and governance experiences 
that can influence different outcomes from REDD+. For instance, we can expect more just and 
equitable benefit sharing mechanisms for REDD in communities were the design of the 
arrangement includes the voices and views of all the members of the collectivity and were 
previously-established, well-designed benefit sharing mechanisms have been put in practice. 
We can also expect that benefits will be more secured when communities have stable 
authorities and strong institutions. The different degrees of both knowledge and involvement 
of the population during the process of negotiation and entry of the intervention may lead to 
inaccuracies and differences in understandings and expectations from REDD+.     
Research Procedures and Data Sources 
The duration of fieldwork was two months, divided into two stages: (1) site selection 
and preparation and (2) visits to the project sites in Madre de Dios. During the first stage, I 
spent fifteen days in Lima evaluating candidate sites for the study and holding meetings with 
officers from different project development organizations working in REDD+ to learn more 
about the progress of projects and evaluate if they offered possibilities for being included in my 
research.  After feasible sites were chosen, I started the preparation for fieldwork.   During the 
second stage, I spent a total of four weeks in the field: one week in Puerto Maldonado, two 
weeks in Infierno, and one week in Bélgica. I arrived in Puerto Maldonado during the first week 
of July and worked at AIDER’s regional office, where I had access to documents and reports on 
the project sites. I conducted interviews with members of AIDER’s team that were involved in 
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the projects at different levels.  During this stage, I established telephone contact with the 
chiefs of my selected sites and scheduled appointments for presenting my research project.  I 
also visited and conducted other interviews with government officials, indigenous 
representatives, and researchers based in Puerto Maldonado. After being granted authorization 
from the communities’ authorities, I proceeded to visit the communities.  AIDER was extremely 
helpful in this phase and not only facilitated the contacts in both communities, but also 
included me in a meeting of the REDD+ roundtable of Madre de Dios. The meeting was held 
during the first week of July in Puerto Maldonado. There, I witnessed a discussion centered on 
the development of the agenda for Mesa REDD+ between members of civil society, 
representative indigenous and producer’s institutions, government officials, and officials from 
non-profit organizations.  
During my stay in the project sites, I visited several households and conducted semi-
structured interviews of a duration between thirty minutes and two hours. The interviews 
mostly aimed at gathering background information about household activities and economy, 
main community business (certified timber harvesting or ecotourism), customary authority and 
power relations, and REDD+. In regards to this specific topic, I tried to cover all possible aspects 
and events of REDD+ in the community: the arrival of the idea, the negotiation of entry and 
consent, the role of the village authorities in the process, the relationship with AIDER, 
knowledge about REDD+, local expectations, involvement and participation, and changes in 
rules and institutions inspired by REDD+. However, the selection criteria for participants were 
different in both communities. Infierno’s authorities provided me a short list of almost ten 
names of comuneros to start with and the rest of participants were obtained using a “snowball” 
sampling strategy.  In the case of Bélgica, the chief provided a list that included the names of all 
the heads of household and a sketch map with the location of their houses. I was a participant 
observer in two public meetings held in Infierno in which comuneros discussed the distribution 
and use of benefits from Posada Amazonas, the community-owned eco-lodge.  To the contrary, 
in the community of Bélgica, I was not allowed to join or observe a public meeting—which 
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lasted nearly 6 hours—where the new rules and changes in the community’s statutes were 
discussed. 
Finally, the post-fieldwork period started in Lima during the first half of August and 
consisted mostly of data processing. Interview information and meeting notes where 
transcribed and analyzed using general codes, grouping information into subtopics. Then, the 
information was matched and contextualized using information from written sources such as 
contracts and agreements, technical reports, research papers, books, and doctoral theses.  
Data Problems and Limitations 
The present research faced many challenges, especially in regards to the process of 
getting participants for interviews, verifying the truthfulness of the responses, and the inclusion 
of women’s views in the study – all compounded by the brief duration of the study. 
Approaching participants in Infierno was not an easy task, due to three important factors. First, 
the geographic distribution of the households proved to be a barrier. These households are 
located along the river, with only a few houses gathered in two urban areas. The rest lie in the 
opposite margin of the Tambopata River and upriver (see Annex A).Access to those areas was 
extremely difficult because of the lack of transportation and the inaccessibility to these 
households resulted in their exclusion from the study. Second, the population is mostly 
unavailable during the daytime because they depart to their fields (“chacras”)  at sunrise and 
return home at sunset. For this reason, most of the respondents were interviewed while they 
were getting ready for work and did not have much time available for the interview. Third, 
Infierno is already an over-researched community and the locals have become less interested in 
participating in further studies.  
Conversely, getting participants for the study in Bélgica was extremely easy. Because the 
relationship between AIDER and the comuneros here is excellent (and I was introduced by one 
of AIDER’s project officials to the community Facilitator), comuneros welcomed me warmly and 
facilitated my work during my entire visit.  This may have produced some bias in the 
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comuneros’ responses as they may have intended to show how much they have learned from 
AIDER’s workshops and how well they are following expert’s recommendations of avoiding 
forest clearing, slash-and-burn cultivation,  and cattle ranching (as well as following some 
guidelines of social behavior) so that the REDD+ project can succeed. I perceived this during the 
first interviews and, therefore, made some adjustments in the way I was approaching the 
respondents. My new strategy was to step back and talk about my background, my previous 
work, and my interests so that the comuneros could separate my work from AIDER. I 
emphasized that my aim was only to understand the process of arrival of REDD+ and not to 
judge or evaluate their activities or their views. 
The inclusion of female respondents in the study was an additional challenging. 
Although I tried to encourage the participation of both men and women equally, this study did 
not collect the views of all the women of the interviewed households. Usually, the women were 
present, but remained silent or only slightly intervened as the men dominated the conversation 
during most of the interviews. This may have resulted in a bias in favor of male opinions. 
However, there were some cases in which women did fully participate in the interviews; this 
was the case of single mothers, widows, or women who were actively involved in community 
organizations and activities (but these were in the minority). In the specific case of Bélgica, I 
managed to interview all of the local women, but there was a language barrier since a group of 
three women only spoke Portuguese.  
To conclude, it is important to acknowledge that the length of my stay in both of the 
sites was too short, especially in Bélgica, to have conducted an in-depth analysis. The results 
presented here should be considered preliminary and will serve as the foundation for further 
research.  
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CHAPTER 3  
THE NATIVE COMMUNITY OF BELGICA: CERTIFIED TIMBER AND CARBON 
Introduction  
Bélgica is a native community located in the region of Madre de Dios, in the province of 
Tahuamanu, in the district of Iñapari. It lies on the right band of the Acre River, which acts as a 
natural border between Peru and Brazil. Bélgica is surrounded by pastures, forestry 
concessions, and non-contacted nomad tribes scattered between the border of Brazil and Peru. 
The population consists of only twenty families who are a mix of Peruvian Yine and natives born 
on the Brazilian side. They speak both Spanish and Portuguese, with only the elders speaking 
Yine. For the most part, the only extant tradition is rubber tapping, which they continue to 
perform to the present day. 
Bélgica is rich in fine timber species (such as mahogany and cedar), which brought the 
interest of loggers and traders. This community is trying to find its way to ensure better life 
conditions for their people. Having gone from rubber tapping and illegal logging to certificated 
timber harvesting, Bélgica is now getting ready for REDD+, which they believe will meet their 
aspiration of securing a living from sustainable forest management and carbon sequestration.   
This chapter tells the story of Bélgica, the formation and evolution of the community 
and their political structure and rules for social order. It describes the arrival of the idea for 
REDD+ and their involvement in certified timber harvesting, which is the main economic activity 
that provides the families with a decent level of material comfort.  Next, it turns into the 
description of the process of negotiation of entry, consent, and implementation of the 
preparatory activities for REDD+ with two different project developers: Asesorandes (a private 
consulting company) and AIDER (a non-profit organization).   
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Brief History of Bélgica:  History, Population, and the Use of Natural Resources   
Up until the 20th century, just as any other indigenous peoples in Peru, the Yine used to live 
dispersed throughout the forest in nuclear families. They practiced traditional activities such as 
hunting, fishing, gathering, and agriculture. By the early 1900’s, foreign traders established and 
imposed a patron-client relationship with the Yine in the area with the indigenous working as 
rubber tappers under a debt patronage system.  The Yine sold any rubber produced to the 
patron and, in exchange, the patron sold them goods. The amount earned by rubber tappers 
was usually less than what they owed the patron, creating a permanent indebtedness. The 
patron of the first permanent settlement of rubber tappers was Justo Bezada, who claimed to 
have come from Belgium and resulted in the community adopting the name “Bélgica” (meaning 
Belgium in Spanish). The final patron was Oswaldo Rubio, who ceased his activities in 1974 
(Asesorandes, 2009). During the following ten years, the Agrarian Bank provided support to the 
Yine in order to independently continue rubber extraction until 1986, when the support shifted 
to cattle ranching (GOREMAD, 2010). As a result, local people returned to agriculture and 
hunting to earn their livelihoods. A portion of the population left Bélgica in search of job 
opportunities in nearby cities in Peru and across the Acre River in Brazil (Asesorandes, 2009).  
In 1988, a cattle ranch company named “Empresa Ganadera Santa Clara SA” attempted 
to take over 8,427 hectares of what people in Bélgica considered to be their territory. The 
company cleared 1,250 hectares and sowed grass without the authorization of the community 
or the Ministry of Agriculture, which was the authority in charge of giving permits and titles for 
farming activities and the recognition of native communities (CESVI, 2006). In order to stop the 
invasion and put an end to the conflict, Bélgica requested the intervention of FENAMAD and 
other allies, such as Dr. Thomas Moore. This North American anthropologist completed a study 
that accompanied the request to the General Directorate of Agrarian Reform of the Ministry of 
Agriculture for the recognition of Bélgica’s territory made in 1992 (GOREMAD, 2010). Finally, 
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Bélgica obtained its title 200212 and received rights and responsibilities over an area of 53,394 
hectares.  The title issues property rights over 17,620 hectares of forest and non-forest land 
with agricultural aptitude13; use rights over 31,502 hectares of forest for sustainable forestry; 
and responsibility over 4,272 hectares for conservation. Bélgica was then able to establish 
contracts for the extraction and use of natural resources (Asesorandes, 2009).  
 However, Bélgica’s first experience with timber harvesting was on the black market. In 
2003, the community established a verbal agreement with a local entrepreneur to harvest 
mahogany and cedar in exchange for a small price. The brief agreement was terminated when 
this person tried to establish a settlement upriver and form a new community in order to 
appropriate the resources of the area. Bélgica received helped from FENAMAD and the Iñapari 
District Municipality to remove the invaders.  
Since 2002, Bélgica has been surrounded by at least nine forest concessions14 that were 
granted over permanent production forests  (with extensions between 20,000 to 40,000 
hectares). The area was attractive for the logging business – as were Bélgica’s forests. In 2003, 
the members of the Council—with the authorization of the Assembly—established their first 
formal contract with a consortium of local entrepreneurs.15 CARPIN S.R.L. was a local-based 
company owned by two partners: Jose Pineda— who dedicated to the logging business—and 
Abraham Cardozo—a powerful businessman who also owned two Forest Concessions called 
MADERYJA and MADERACRE. Between 2004 and 2007, CARPIN prepared and executed annual 
management plans for the harvest of mahogany and cedar – valuable species for which it 
offered prices below the average in the market. This gave CARPIN a big profit margin by selling 
                                                          
12
 Resolution  087-2002-MA-DRA-MDD of December 19, 2002 issuing the title No. 779  
13
 In the demarcation of the communities, the classification of soils is made according to the Ministry of 
Agriculture’s criteria of Capacity for Greater Use.  
14
 The nine concessions were: Maderacre, Maderija, Pumaquiro S.A.C., Maderera Industrial Isabelita (EMINI) S.A.C., 
Industrial Maderera Amazónica Tecnificada (AMATEC) S.A.C., Agroindustrial Victoria S.A.C., Maderera Canales 
Tahuamanu (CATAHUA) S.A.C., Maderera Paujil S.A.C. and  Aserradero Espinoza S.A. 
15
 The agreement is called “Convenio de Cooperación Mutua entre la Comunidad Nativa de Bélgica y los 
Operadores Forestales de Iñapari” (Mutual Cooperation Agreement between the Bélgica Native Community and 
the Forest Operators of Iñapari). 
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the logs to local companies such as Agroindustrial Victoria SAC. Nevertheless, CARPIN did hire 
labor from the community. CARPIN also provided services, equipment and annual payments to 
the Community Council (Asesorandes, 2009) and households began to receive monthly 
payments of 400 Nuevos Soles (approximately USD$ 160 at current exchange rate). 
Respondents agree that the deal with CARPIN was not beneficial to them because the price the 
company paid them for high-quality timber was extremely low and the payments were delayed 
(and sometimes incomplete). After a number of infringements, Bélgica decided to quit working 
with CARPIN. Later, the Bélgica Community found out that after breaking the deal, CARPIN had 
continued extracting timber from Belgica’s without the community’s authorization. CARPIN had 
been selling this timber for the purpose of financing Mr. Cardozo’s campaign to run for Mayor 
of the District Municipality of Iñapari. CARPIN received cash advances from companies and 
investors with the promise of paying them back with timber extracted from Bélgica.   
After this, Bélgica immediately started working with Agro industrial Victoria SAC. This 
company prepared the annual management plans for the years 2008 and 2009. During this 
time, the company also hired comuneros for forest activities and the monthly payments per 
household increased by 250%; now the comuneros (the residents of the community) received 
1,000 Nuevos Soles (nearly USD$ 400) – except for those households that had been established 
for less than three years (Asesorandes, 2009). The company also made annual payments in 
services and cash to the community institutions, which were significantly higher than CARPIN’s 
(according to the respondents). There is agreement in that the commercial relationship with 
this company was excellent. However, Bélgica later received a more interesting offer from 
Empresa Maderera Rio Yaverija S.A.C (MADERYJA) – with whom Bélgica began working in 2010. 
 In his technical report, Pollini (Asesorandes, 2009) reflects on the changes brought by 
the logging business on people’s lifestyles since their contract with CARPIN. He states that 
material comfort increased as individuals and the community began to purchase individually 
and collectively owned equipment, such as electricity generator, home appliances, off-board 
engines, motorcycles, and so on. Since community members receive a monthly payment, 
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subsistence activities are becoming less practiced and are in decline, including hunting, 
gathering, and fishing. Moreover, Pollini observed that agriculture has also been impacted as 
timber extraction agreements created more restrictions and prohibitions regarding traditional 
slash-and-burn practice (because they pose high risks of fires).  Agriculture was also limited due 
to the aim of reserving the most standing forest possible.  
Authority Structure, Powers and Rules for Social Order 
Bélgica’s political and authority structures have been created in accordance to the 
mandates of the Law of Native Communities of 1974. In Bélgica, just like any other native 
community, the Community Assembly is the main decision-making body and the Community 
Council is the governing body that holds the power and represents comuneros in their 
interactions with the State, companies, non-profit organizations, and others. Comuneros are 
also organized into associations created in the context of productive projects with companies 
and non-profit organizations for the extraction of timber and the production of rubber and 
handicrafts. Outside of its organizational structure, the community counts on a Legal Adviser 
and a Facilitator, who provide assistance and advice in regards to projects and contracts for 
natural resources extraction (both are non-indigenous). The Facilitator is a key actor who 
closely works with the President of the community and holds informal responsibilities.  Rules 
for social order are established by the Assembly, written in the Community Statutes, and strictly 
enforced by the ruling authorities. In this section, based on the information gathered through 
the interviews, I describe authority structure and the powers of community members, 
authorities, the adviser, and Facilitator as well as the rules for social order in Bélgica.  
Authority Structure and Powers 
The main deliberative and decision-making body is the Community Assembly. It is 
composed of all members—thirty two men and women—who are registered in the Registry of 
Inhabitants. In this instance, the most important decisions are made in regards to the election 
of authorities, management and administration of natural resources, cultural matters, and 
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other matters of importance. Bélgica’s Assembly meets once every two months in ordinary 
meetings and calls for extraordinary meetings whenever necessary. All community members 
have the obligation to attend the meetings. All decisions, including the election of new 
authorities, are made only with 50% + one vote of the attendees.  
The Community Council is the main governing and representative body in the 
community. It is composed of an elected five-person body, which includes the President, 
Secretary, Treasurer, and two members at-large. There is no history of women holding public 
office in the community. Elections are called once every two years by the Assembly in an 
Elections Meeting. Their responsibility is to represent the community in public actions and 
negotiations with companies, banks, and government and non-government institutions. 
Therefore, every newly elected Council needs to register in the Public Registry (located in the 
region’s capital) so that the authorities are vested with legal capacity to represent the 
community. All members of the council are automatically entitled to receive a bonus in their 
salaries for holding public office. Authorities can stay in office for as long as the Assembly 
allows, but can also be removed if they appropriate community resources, present inadequate 
behavior, or are inefficient.  
The maximum authority of the community is the President, who is elected by the 
assembly and is entitled to sign contracts, agreements, and preparatory documents with the 
authorization of the Assembly. The President is entitled to make decisions in urgent situations, 
which can be relayed to the Assembly after the fact, and may also hire professionals or advisers 
at his convenience, setting their salaries and informing the community ex-post. These executive 
powers have been agreed and approved by the Community Assembly and have been included 
in the Community Statues.  As we will see later, these capabilities have strong implications both 
for transparency in the management of community’s natural and monetary resources and for 
the legitimacy of the decisions made by the President. According to some of the respondents, 
when the period of elections approaches, comuneros either express their interest in running for 
elections or recommend their candidates. Once the candidates have been defined, the 
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candidates select their prospective Secretary, Treasurer, and two members. Next, the 
candidates visit the households to seek support and votes.  
The two authorities that work in collaboration with the President are (1) the Secretary 
of Acts and Documents and (2) the Treasurer. The Secretary is responsible for keeping the 
records in the minute book and maintaining every document that belongs to the community. 
However, community’s documents have been kept in the city of Iñapari since 2011 at the 
Facilitator’s office. During the flood of 2012, many of these documents were lost or damaged. 
The Treasurer is responsible for keeping the financial books and managing the funds. Records 
are kept manually. Every month, the Treasurer and the President administrate the payments 
from MADERYJA and distribute the money among the families. The remaining money is also 
managed by the Treasurer and the President, but reports of the earnings and expenses are not 
presented to the community, nor are demanded by them. 
The Secretary of production is especially dedicated to the conduction and 
administration of all the economic and productive initiatives by the community. In particular, 
the Secretary supervises and keeps records of the amount of timber extracted by MADERYJA 
and then informs the community. This position enables the community to have control over the 
activities of the company.  The current Secretary was elected for this position because of his 
education and training as a Forestry technician while attending high school in the city of Iberia.  
In accordance with the high importance the community gives to correct social behavior 
in the context of the projects underway in the community, a position for a Secretary of 
Discipline has also been included in the Community Statutes. This person should be in charge of 
making sure that the comuneros behave accordingly during the meetings in and visits outside of 
the community. However, at the moment of my fieldwork, no one had been appointed to this 
position. The control of the comuneros’ discipline is a permanent responsibility of the council 
and the comuneros.  
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In the context of the forest certification process during 2012, the community installed a 
Forest Committee (as required by the FSC rules). This committee is now in charge of supervising 
on site forest activities within the communal territory and following the standards established 
by FSC certification (explained further in this chapter). The Committee is legitimized by a 
statute dictated by ADECOMP and the Forest Regent, constituted of a Board elected by the 
Assembly, and approved by the comuneros. The President of the Board is in charge of 
coordinating the committee’s actions with ADECOMP and then informing the Community 
Assembly. The Vice-President of the Board keeps record of the meetings, coordinates the 
training of the members of the committee, and supervises the surveillance system and 
Surveillance Team. The Monitoring Brigade is in charge of supervising logging activities, 
including harvesting, planting seedlings, road maintenance and also supervising the Surveillance 
Team. The latter is composed by two security guards who travel around the territory to protect 
it from invaders or illegal loggers. Surveillance is probably the most difficult and demanding 
task to accomplish (due to the size of the territory). 
The population is also organized into production associations. Men are involved in the 
Rubber Tappers Association (RTA), while women are involved in the Artisan Committee. Both 
are framed in the PRA project financed by USAID, which provides access to markets. Since 2011, 
a group of ten comuneros have formed the RTA – a small company for the extraction of rubber 
(shiringa). The association has the structure of a committee and is composed by nine men and 
one woman16 (no additional members are allowed). This group receives the help of women who 
are in charge of the greenhouse where rubber trees are grown. USAID has provided equipment 
and is helping the RTA to find markets to sell their products. On the other hand, the Artisan 
Committee—established in 2010—involves the participation of fifteen young and adult women. 
They gather almost every afternoon at the community house to elaborate paintings on fabrics, 
bracelets, and other items. Men help the women in obtaining seeds and natural ropes from the 
forest for their handicrafts.  
                                                          
16
 She is the daughter of the President. This person also leads the committee of artisans.  
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There are also several political bodies outside of the Community that have varying 
degrees of influence. Bélgica is affiliated with FENAMAD – the indigenous federation that had 
an important role in the defense of Bélgica’s territory, its recognition, and titling process since 
the 1980s.  Some key informants argue that this support was mostly based in the presence of 
non-contacted tribes up the Acre River and that the size of Bélgica’s recognized territory (in 
contrast to their small population for only twenty families) is in fact a strategy for protecting 
those tribes. Nowadays, the relationship is distant as comuneros consider that FENAMAD does 
not fulfill the role as a representative organization for them anymore. They argue that the 
organization is more supportive of other ethnic groups who are currently involved in illegal 
mining and logging. The FENAMAD federation representatives visited Bélgica in the negotiation 
phase of entry with Asesorandes, back in 2010, in an attempt to persuade them into not giving 
consent for REDD+. However, comuneros ignored the request and continued the negotiations 
because, they argue, that they do not align with FEAMAD’s ideology.  
Bélgica belongs to the elected District Municipality of Iñapari, which in turn belongs to 
the Provincial Municipality of Tahuamanu. Every year, Bélgica prepares projects or requests for 
the “Participatory Budget.” Bélgica has requested the maintenance of their road, access to 
drinking water and sewage, and electricity. Up to the date of this research, these requests 
remain unattended. The district government is not directly involved in any ongoing activity with 
the community. The perception of the comuneros is that the district government authorities 
only visit the community for political campaign when running for elections. Municipalities do 
not have jurisdiction in regards to forest or land use. Thus, this level of government is not 
involved in REDD+ process and discussions.  
 The Legal Adviser and the Facilitator are two key actors in Bélgica because they greatly 
influence community’s decisions. They are neither indigenous nor community authorities. The 
Legal Adviser is in charge of doing “paperwork” on behalf of the community, which involves the 
revision of contracts with companies for natural resources extraction, the registration of the 
community statutes in the Public Registry, assistance with clearing infractions, and/or making 
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claims at SUNAT (Peru’s Internal Revenue Service). This adviser also acts as their attorney and 
represents them in negotiations with companies and when facing or making lawsuits. In 
addition to influencing decisions, his opinion is highly valued by all community members and 
authorities.  The Adviser visits the community and maintains permanent contact, although 
mainly with the President and the Facilitator. In the past, the Adviser helped in the revision of 
contracts with MADERYJA, Asesorandes, and AIDER. Although he does not receive a salary, 
many of the respondents mentioned that, once REDD money comes, they would pay him for his 
“help.” Other respondents mentioned that, during the first negotiations with Asesorandes, a 
small percentage of the benefits were being reserved as a “reward.” In fact, all community 
members consider that his intervention on their behalf is in “good faith” because he does not 
charge the community for his services and is always available for them. The current Adviser was 
a Congressman for Madre de Dios Region during the presidency of Alejandro Toledo (2001-
2006) and was also appointed as Minister of Justice in 2005. In the region, he is known for 
defending the causes of local illegal loggers and miners.  
The Facilitator is also a key figure in Bélgica’s politics and natural resources 
management. The Facilitator is in every day contact with the community, working side by side 
with the resident and keeping in contact with the Legal Adviser. He is present in every 
community meeting when matters such as contracts, rules, conflicts, and business ideas are 
discussed. This position is currently occupied by one of the former partners of CARPIN – the 
forest company with which Bélgica made their first logging contract. After the end of that 
contract with CARPIN, he continued to make small contracts for timber extraction with 
Bélgica—which were directly managed by the President—that provided support to the 
community at the same time. Since 2009, this person gradually became the community’s 
Facilitator. Next, he tried to include himself in the benefit sharing arrangement of the Bélgica 
Carbon Project (claiming a 10% of the carbon sales), but the community did not accept this 
deal. Since January 2012, he is paid a salary of 5,800 Nuevos Soles, (approximately USD$ 2,320) 
– almost four times more that the highest salary that comuneros receive (how this arrangement 
was reached is explained in the next section). There is ambivalence in how people think about 
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the Facilitator. On the one hand, respondents say that his salary is extremely high. On the other 
hand, they say that he “helps them with paperwork, advice, emergencies, driving them to the 
city, and bank operations.” Comuneros consider that his presence is important because he 
serves as an intermediary with authorities and companies and because he has the expertise to 
deal with all these actors – expertise that they lack. Some respondents mentioned that paying a 
salary is more convenient than paying in timber. In the past, they did not know how much 
timber the Facilitator extracted, and now (with the annual cut plans and the FSC regulations), 
they need to maintain control of their timber. However, there are some respondents who claim 
that the Facilitator still cuts timber from other areas with the permission of the community’s 
President. The Facilitator’s terms of reference are not detailed in the community minutes, nor 
are they clear to the comuneros.   
Rules for Social Order 
The rules for social order are described in the Community Statutes, which were defined 
in 2009 (but were last registered in 2012) using the suggested template by the Superintendent 
of Public Registries.  Bélgica’s rules were discussed by the comuneros in meetings. The statutes 
establish rules for social order, defines the rights and responsibilities of the community 
members and the functions and powers of the authorities. The statutes of Bélgica include 
specific rules in regards to the exploitation of the natural resources. They  give important 
decision-making powers and certain autonomy to the President of the community to negotiate 
with foreign individuals, companies, the state, civil associations, non-profit organizations, 
banks, fiduciaries, and trust funds – referred to as “third parties” in the statutes. They also 
legitimize the presence of a Facilitator and a Legal Adviser, although their functions are not 
clearly defined.  
In Bélgica, membership in the community as a comunero is a key criteria for access to 
resources. Not everybody can be a comunero and rules for becoming one tend to become more 
severe over time. Comuneros need to be born in Bélgica, be the children of other comuneros, 
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or come from another indigenous village (either from the Peruvian or the Brazilian side) and 
must comply with some requirements. In that case, they need to resign from any membership 
in their original community, give proof to be free of any criminal background, and be approved 
by 80% of the community members. Non-indigenous individuals can only join as spouses of 
comuneros and need to pass a two-year trial period in the community and participate in 
collective work. Comuneros have the right to vote in the Assemblies and to be elected for 
public office.  
Comuneros may lose their status in the Assembly for “bad behavior” as judged by any 
other comunero. Drinking, missing attendance to the meetings, and not participating in 
collective work—which includes cleaning the community, cleaning the road, repairing the 
community house, and so on—are considered bad behavior, although they are not included in 
the statutes. A comunero can go through a series of sanctions, including fines and temporary 
suspensions, until they are finally removed from the registry of inhabitants. However, there is 
certain flexibility depending on who the person breaking the rules is. 
In Bélgica, being a comunero since the advent of REDD has become a privileged status 
because the Community Statue allows them to participate in the benefit sharing arrangement 
that will assign a fixed monthly salary per household that surpasses the national minimum 
wage. Regulations of the “proper behavior” of the comuneros specially made specifically for 
REDD are included in a “Statement” that has been prepared by the President, the Legal Adviser, 
and the Facilitator. The justification is that the buyers of the carbon credits will want to make 
sure that the benefits from REDD will be invested in improving community’s quality of life and 
not to incentivize bad habits. 
Comuneros also have access to a piece of land for farming that they may request from 
the President of the community and from the Assembly. Comuneros can only have their farms 
on forest fallow and cannot open more fields without express authorization. Comuneros also 
have access to the common pool of resources within the community lands, such as rivers and 
37 
 
forests. They can hunt, fish, and gather products for their households, but they cannot cut 
timber unless it is used as construction material and is approved by the President.   
In regards to the use and exploitation of natural resources, the statutes are very specific 
about who the community can make contracts with, which activities are allowed, and which will 
be approved by the Assembly. Not only comuneros, but also third parties can exploit natural 
resources upon the Assembly’s consent. The Community Council is in charge of the 
administration and management of the benefits received by the economic activities related to 
the exploitation of natural resources, however, this responsibility can be given to banks or 
fiduciary institutions upon the consent of 80% of the Assembly members. 
The Bélgica Carbon Project and the Experience with Asesorandes (2008 – 2011)  
There have been two stages in Bélgica’s experience with REDD+. The first one was the 
Bélgica Carbon Project, between 2008 and 2011, with Asesorandes – a consulting firm based in 
Lima that specializes in business development and financial engineering. The second one is 
ongoing since the end of 2011 with AIDER.  
Negotiation of Entry 
The idea of REDD+ arrived in the community in 2008, brought by people with whom the 
community had preexisting relationship; it was José Gomez Robles who served as Bélgica’s 
Facilitator while working at Iñapari Radio. Gomez is a local journalist and entrepreneur who—
according to the respondents—attempted to purchase 15,000 hectares (almost 28% of Bélgica’s 
land) for timber harvesting and reforestation activities for 1.5 million dollars. The offer was 
discussed in a community meeting and was further declined because communal lands cannot 
be sold according to the law.  
The same year, Gomez returned to the community and presented the idea of a “carbon 
project” during a community meeting. People heard the word “carbon” for the first time in a 
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context other than its common usage – they only knew the carbon (which in Spanish is the 
same word for charcoal, called “carbon vegetal”) that they made out of logs for cooking. The 
concept was too abstract and confusing. In a series of meetings in the community with all its 
members Gomez explained what a carbon project consisted of and the economic benefits it 
would bring. This business alternative seemed extremely interesting to the population and 
raised high expectations. Next, Gomez contacted Asesorandes and invited the President of the 
community over to a meeting in Lima. On his return, the President presented the idea to the 
community in an Ordinary Meeting where it was enthusiastically discussed and approved by the 
Assembly. 
Activities and Development of the Project 
In August 2008, Bélgica signed a six-month contract of exclusivity with Asesorandes to 
initiate the preparation for the “Bélgica Carbon Project,” for which the “Bélgica Joint Venture 
Company” was created. The company was a consortium between Bélgica Native Community, 
Asesorandes, and four other partners17 who financed or took charge of several aspects of the 
project. Gomez became a partner in the consortium and was replaced in his functions as 
Facilitator by another individual (Asesorandes, 2009). Forest Invest SAC, a company owned by 
Abraham Cardozo18 (the former co-owner of CARPIN and MADERYJA forestry companies), was 
in charge of the development of the “Sustainable Management Plan” in partnership with 
Carbon Decisions S.A. The plan included the design of a REDD+ Project, the design of benefit 
sharing mechanisms, and investment plans of REDD+ revenues (Asesorandes, 2009).  
In May 2010, Bélgica and Asesorandes signed a second contract for the development 
and commercialization of environmental services. Under this new arrangement, the community 
received certification from the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC)19 – an international third-party 
                                                          
17
 These other companies include Ecosystem Services LLC, Carbon Decisions SA, Biological Capital, and SSSAP. 
18
 Abraham Cardozo is an example of a relationship that predates REDD+; as we saw, he was the owner of CARPIN 
and former owner of MADERYJA. 
19
 FSC Certification was granted on February 7, 2011. Certificate Code SW-FM/COC-005336-A. License Code: FSC-
C102381. 
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auditing body that sets standards for the sustainable harvesting of the timber. The ADECOMP 
Association (a FSC accredited certification body in Peru) carried out the assessment to ensure 
that the operation complied with all the FSC requirements.20 Certification was successfully 
achieved for five years, to be monitored on yearly basis. As a requirement during the process of 
certification, the Forest Committee was created. After obtaining certification, Bélgica signed a 
contract for five years with MADERYJA for certified timber harvesting, ensuring a monthly 
income for the families. With the consent of the Community Assembly of Bélgica, Asesorandes 
established a strategic alliance with the National Fund for the Environment (FONAM). FONAM is 
an environmental fund that is officially charged with the carbon market promotion office of 
Peru and works directly with the private and public sector by offering counseling for the 
development of carbon projects and supporting the process of fundraising for investors from 
national and international financial organizations. This institution developed the required 
studies during the feasibility phase for the elaboration of the Project Document Design (PDD) 
and for its validation by the standards.  
 In January 2012, Bélgica and Asesorandes were about to sign a contract for ten years 
(renewable every ten years) that would finally insert Bélgica into the implementation phase of 
REDD+ and sell carbon credits. The contract stipulated that FONAM would negotiate the first 
carbon credits sale to cover FONAM’s expenditures (USD $140,000 spent in studies, PDD, and 
future validation) and the expenditures made by Asesorandes (USD$ 120,000.) Additionally, this 
first profit would also cover the project’s operating costs (USD$ 160,000) and ensure a 
minimum of USD$80,000 for the community. Thus, each household (22) would receive a first 
payment of USD$ 3,636. The payments to the community would be made through a fiduciary 
institution  selected by Asesorandes. Further carbon sales would continue to be negotiated by 
FONAM upon the community’s authorization. The gross profit from the second and subsequent 
sales would also be administered by the fiduciary institution and distributed between 
Asesorandes (20%) and the community (80%), which would be divided as follows: direct 
                                                          
20
 The Forestry Law establishes the figure of ‘Forest Regent’, who is responsible for ensuring that management 
plans are properly implemented. ADECOMP serves as the regent. 
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payments to families (16%) which cannot represent less than USD$ 80,000, community 
development (32%), operational costs (32%.) 
Termination of the Project: The End of the Partnership with Asesorandes 
After almost three years of negotiations, the relationship with Asesorandes came to an 
end for several reasons that are explained by the comuneros. They were disappointed by the 
fact that the project was taking longer than expected and that the benefit sharing arrangement 
was unfair to the community. Additional factors—such as the influence of the Facilitator and 
the opinion of other professionals—prevented Bélgica from signing the final contract with the 
company.  
Other reasons are that there were aspects in the relationship with Asesorandes that 
were deteriorating. For instance, comuneros felt that they had lost patience with and 
confidence in the company.  It took nearly two and a half years for the project to go from the 
identification stage to the culmination of the feasibility stage. Comuneros argue that the 
company showed to have several financing problems that delayed some of the programmed 
activities. Respondents also mentioned that whenever Asesorandes visited Bélgica, their staff 
would not cover the cost of food and transportation that were provided by the locals, causing 
harm to their already limited economies.  
From the comuneros’ perspective, Asesorandes had imposed a benefit sharing 
arrangement in the contract between Asesorandes, FONAM, and the community without 
consulting or negotiating it with the Council and the Assembly of Bélgica. Moreover, the 
arrangement was expressed in percentages, a concept that the locals did not understand since 
most of them only manage basic arithmetic. Bélgica’s authorities consulted the Facilitator and 
other professionals in this matter who agreed that the share claimed by Asesorandes was too 
high – considering that (1) Bélgica was already going to cover the entire project’s operation 
costs, (2) FONAM would have negotiated the credits, and (3) the company was only going to 
provide consulting services. Asesorandes would have only acted as broker and would have 
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ended up making more profit than the community. This seemed like an unfair deal to the 
comuneros and, therefore, they decided to decline. 
Some other factors may have intervened and interrupted the relationship with 
Asesorandes. Comuneros mentioned that, during the negotiation process, the community 
Facilitator demanded a share of 10%. It is not clear from the information gathered in this 
investigation whether the percentage referred to the total of the gross profits (100%) or to the 
remaining percentage after paying Asesorandes (80%). Again, the authorities consulted a 
second opinion and were recommended to not accept this demand in either case. Instead, they 
were advised to compensate the Facilitator with a fixed monthly salary and formally hire him. 
The Facilitator started receiving this salary in January 2012, which is paid by the revenues from 
the community’s timber sales. It is not clear from the interviews or documents whether the 
Facilitator’s inability to position himself as one of the beneficiaries of the project would have 
lead him to obstruct the negotiations with Asesorandes. 
After the contract was not signed, Asesorandes demanded that the community pay 
US$120,000 to cover their expenses. The company kept all the documents and results of the 
studies made under the previous contracts as a means of putting pressure on the community to 
pay back this amount. According to the authorities, it was finally agreed that Bélgica would pay 
the company back once they made a profit from the first and second carbon credits sale. 
However, the issue is still unresolved and no accurate information regarding this matter could 
be obtained from the interviews or written documents.  
Asesorandes’ intervention has affected Bélgica in many ways, especially influencing 
comuneros in their ways of using the forests and the construction of a discourse regarding 
social behavior. Asesorandes visited the community often to hold training workshops where 
people were instructed in topics such as climate change, carbon sequestration, sustainable 
agriculture, and agroforestry. These have influenced a change in the way the comuneros use 
the land. For instance, comuneros report to have changed their agricultural practices by using 
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only forest fallow to make their farms, reducing their area for plots, diversifying the products, 
and by halting cattle ranching (which seems to be only what they say, as there cattle was 
observed in a few farms using large extensions of land). They also report to have been taught 
“to take care of the environment” by managing their waste and recycling. There are signs in the 
center of the community to remind comuneros and visitors to keep the community clean. 
Teachings or “recommendations” (regarding social aspects) are ever present in comuneros 
discourse. Comuneros mentioned that it is important to eradicate alcohol consumption and 
domestic violence. Comuneros report that these two have declined because they need to deal 
with outsiders after realizing that investors, NGOs, and cooperation agencies would not want to 
deal with an “ill and problematic community.”  
Comuneros realize that, when they decided to engage in the Bélgica Carbon Project, 
their decision was based on over-expectations and that they did not have accurate information 
on the details of the carbon project – such as its duration, costs, obligations and possible risks. 
They also realized that dealing with the project was somewhat complicated – as the President 
and the Facilitator had to constantly travel to Lima for meetings with the Consortium. 
Knowledge was required to deal with them, another reason why they consider that the 
Facilitator’s role is important in their organization.  
Certified Timber Extraction: MADERYJA S.A.C. 
MADERYJA is the company that has been contracted by Bélgica’s Council and approved 
by the Assembly to harvest timber in the Bélgica Community since April 2010.21 This company 
was formerly owned by Abraham Cardozo—a member of the Bélgica Consortium and ex co-
owner of CARPIN—and was recently sold to a Chinese investor. MADERYJA has a five-year 
contract with Bélgica for harvesting hardwood for export, such as mahogany and a variety of 
local species. The company owns a sawmill in the city of Iñapari, where the wood is 
transformed into hardwood strip flooring and then transported to Lima for export. Extraction is 
                                                          
21
 “Contrato de asociación para el aprovechamiento sostenible de los recursos naturales y desarrollo integral de la 
comunidad Bélgica” was signed on April 21st, 2010. 
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performed under the constant supervision of the Forest Committee and MADERYJA 
supervisors.  
MADERYJA pays the community a fixed monthly cash advance for the harvesting of an 
Annual Logging Parcel (PCA), which refers to the area that will be harvested during one year. 
This is done according to the Annual Operating Plan (POA), which is the plan or schedule for 
logging. At the end of each year, the total amount of harvested wood is calculated and the 
difference is paid. During the first year, the cash advance was 20,000 Nuevos Soles (USD$ 
8,000). During the second year, it went up to 40,000 Nuevos Soles (approximately USD$ 
16,000), which is what they currently use to pay for community expenses and to distribute 
among the households. Income is to be distributed among the twenty households formally 
established and living in the community, according to criteria established by the comuneros. 
Community expenses include the salary of the Facilitator, fuel for the generator that provides 
electric energy during the night time, fuel for the SUV truck that is used for transporting the 
President of the community and the comuneros to the city of Iñapari almost every week, extra 
compensation for the school teacher and nurse, travel expenses to cover authorities’ 
participation in workshops or meetings in the region or in Lima, and an emergency fund.  
In August every year, several community members are temporarily employed during 
harvest time, which provided additional income to some families. Women are hired as cooks 
and men are hired as guides – and both are paid a daily stipend. The locals are preferred over 
foreigners because they know the territory and the location of the logs. MADERYJA trains them 
in the use of equipment, such as GPS and the compass. Community members are also taught 
how to measure standing timber. This is especially useful for the comuneros to keep record of 
how much wood is being harvested in order to make sure they are paid for all the felled timber.   
As part of the agreement, MADERYJA provides bridges, the football field, the provision 
of seedlings, maintenance for part of the dirt road, and any other additional services the 
community may require. In 2011, in form of gratitude to the Community Council, the company 
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gave an electricity generator and a 4x4 SUV vehicle — which is in hands of the President of the 
community and is driven by his sons and sons-in-law. The company is required to provide 
access to the information on its operations in order to meet all the requirements of the FSC 
certification.22  
When prompted about their knowledge about the value of certified timber in other 
operations, community members said that they do not know the prices of timber nor verify 
prices with other sources. The respondents mentioned that the President, the Facilitator, and 
the Secretary of Production are the ones in charge of verifying the prices. Even though 
comuneros are suspicious that the price they are paid for their certified timber might be low, 
they seem satisfied overall. The comuneros accept it because the company claims that the cost 
of labor, machinery, and fuel are high and that otherwise the community would not be able to 
extract the timber on their own.23  
Comuneros express that their involvement is necessary to ensure that logging is being 
done in order to meet the established rules for their own benefit. The Forest Committee 
supervises MADERYJA’s activities to ensure that they are in compliance with the terms of FSC.24 
Comuneros show pride and seem to enjoy participating in this activity because they are 
acquiring sufficient skills for and knowledge on sustainable forestry.  
Benefit Sharing Arrangements 
Benefits of the certified timber sales are distributed among thirty-three registered and 
active community members (as of July 2012). According to them, the distribution follows rules 
and scales that are only orally stated. The salary scale is composed of five categories that were 
calculated by the President and the Facilitator and were discussed with the Assembly (who 
                                                          
22
 The Chain of Custody certification is a mechanism for tracking certified material from the forest to the final 
product to ensure that the wood, wood fiber, or non-wood forest produce contained in the product or product line 
can be traced back to certified forests. 
23
 These claims were not verified with the company. 
24
 More information on the functions of the Forest Committee is detailed in the “authority and rules for social 
order” section of this chapter. 
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approved them in a meeting). The shares that comuneros receive are calculated in 
consideration of people’s civil status, age, gender, and the burden of holding public 
responsibilities. The categories are: (1) member of the Council, (2) heads of households (HH) 
with public office (committees), (3) male heads of households, (4) female heads of households, 
and (5) single men 18 years or older. Only one salary per household is allowed. Salaries range 
between 1.25% to 3.75% of the total monthly payment that Bélgica receives from MADERYJA – 
which is currently 40,000 Nuevos Soles a month and 480,000 Nuevos Soles a year 
(approximately USD $16,000 a month, USD $192,000 a year). Salaries are adjusted every year 
since the community’s annual income varies according to the amount of timber to be 
harvested.   
TABLE 1 – SALARY CATEGORIES UNDER CURRENT BENEFIT SHARING ARRANGEMENT  
 
CATEGORY/STATUS 
NUMBER OF 
PEOPLE IN 
THE 
CATEGORY 
INCOME IN 
DOLLARS 
EQUIVALENT PERCENTAJE 
OF COMMUNITY INCOME 
1 MEMBER OF THE COUNCIL 3 600 3.75 
2 MALE HH /  PUBLIC OFFICE 3 560 3.50 
3 MALE HH 9 480 3.00 
4 SINGLE MOTHER / WIDOW 2 400 2.50 
5 SINGLE MAN 4 200 1.25 
 
ADULT / MARIED WOMEN 12 0 0 
 Table 1 shows the categories and correspondent salaries according to the benefit 
sharing arrangement in effect in 2012.  In reality, there are some comuneros who earn more of 
what their current status allows. According to most of the respondents, the members of the 
Council—the President and Treasurer in particular—pay higher salaries to their direct relatives 
(brothers, sons, sons in law). These favored relatives justified these exceptions arguing that 
they had larger families or were former authorities.  
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TABLE 2- BENEFIT SHARING ARRANGEMENT FROM TIMBER SALES PERCENTAGES AND 
AMOUNTS OF DIRECT PAYMENTS TO HOUSEHOLDS ACCORDING TO CATEGORY 
 
POSITION 
NUMBER 
OF PEOPLE 
IN 
CATEGORY 
CORRESPONDING 
PERCENTAJE OF 
COMMUNITY 
INCOME 
ACCORDING TO 
RULES 
RECEIVED 
PERCENTAJE 
OF 
COMMUNITY 
INCOME 
SALARY 
IN USD 
RELATIONSHIP 
TO THE 
RULING 
AUTHORITIES 
FACILITATOR 1  14.50 2,320 facilitator 
COUNCIL 1 3.75 3.75 600   
COUNCIL 1 3.75 3.75 600   
COUNCIL 1 3.75 3.75 600   
PUBLIC OFFICE 1 3.50 3.50 560   
PUBLIC OFFICE 1 3.50 3.50 560   
PUBLIC OFFICE 1 3.50 3.75*  600 direct relative 
MALE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD 1 3.00 3.00 480   
MALE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD 1 3.00 3.00 480   
MALE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD 1 3.00 3.00 480   
MALE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD 1 3.00 3.50*  560 direct relative 
MALE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD 1 3.00 3.50* 560 direct relative 
MALE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD 1 3.00 3.50* 560 direct relative 
MALE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD 1 3.00 3.50* 560 direct relative 
MALE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD 1 3.00 3.50* 560 direct relative 
MALE HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD 1 3.00 3.75* 600 direct relative 
SINGLE MOTHER / WIDOW 1 2.50 2.50 400   
SINGLE MOTHER / WIDOW 1 2.50 2.50 400   
SINGLE MAN 1 1.25 1.25 200   
SINGLE MAN 1 1.25 2.50* 400 direct relative 
SINGLE MAN 1 1.25 3.00* 480  direct relative 
SINGLE MAN 1 1.25 0.00* 0 "bad" behavior 
ADULT / MARRIED WOMEN 12 0.00 0.00 0 
 
Table 2 shows the total number of community members and the income each one receives. 
It can be noted that there are six heads of household who actually receive more than they are 
entitled to according to orally stated rules. The same occurs in the case of one man who holds 
public office (in a committee) but receives the salary of a Council member. There is the case of 
a single man who is receiving the salary of a male head of household without having any 
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dependents. Some of the respondents reported that this person was receiving a salary even 
before of reaching the age of majority.25  In contrast, there is the case of a single man in his 
twenties who does not receive a salary because he has been accused of “bad behavior” for not 
attending the meetings, for spending extended times outside the community, for not 
participating in collective work, and for having bad manners (this person has been 
unsuccessfully petitioning for a salary over the last year). The table also includes the equivalent 
percentage of the Facilitator’s salary with the purpose of contrasting its proportion against the 
salaries of the community members.  
The benefit sharing arrangement excludes adult women because they are considered to 
be “dependent” on either their father or their husband. There are twelve women in the village 
who are not entitled to receive a salary. The only ones receiving salaries are widows and single 
mothers. The salary women receive is never higher than the salary of a male head of household 
and they do not hold public office. 
In order to have the right to receive a salary, comuneros need to comply with some 
rules of social order. First of all, they need to attend the community meetings, to participate in 
collective work, and to maintain good and proper behavior.  The Council can impose fines or 
deductions from an individual’s salaries in case they disobey social norms. For instance, alcohol 
consumption or not attending the communal meetings results in a fine of 50 Nuevos Soles 
(equivalent to USD$ 20.00). What is collected in fines goes into an “emergency fund” that is 
managed by the Treasury. However, even though the authorities report to have detained 
money from some comuneros, they are unable to answer how much has been collected or how 
this money is spent in the case of an emergency.  According to the respondents, communal 
rules prohibit that income is invested outside the community. Comuneros should live and spend 
in Bélgica – otherwise they will lose their privileges. For instance, comuneros that are away for 
long periods lose their status and are no longer allowed to benefit from the revenues. 
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 The age of majority in Peru is eighteen. 
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Almost 64% of the total monthly income in the community goes to covering direct 
payments to the comuneros, while 14.5% go to the Facilitator’s salary and the rest, 21.5% goes 
to cover community expenses.  These percentages have been calculated from the results of 
household’s interviews (as there are no official expense reports made by the Treasury). 
Therefore, comuneros ignore how the funds are managed or invested.  Only a small number of 
respondents feel disturbed by the Council’s lack of transparency in the management of the 
funds, while the rest of the respondents seemed to not have a problem. There are no official 
complaints or claims made by the comuneros to have the Treasury disclose the reports. In sum, 
the current benefit sharing arrangement excludes less powerful individuals in the community, 
while it benefits the ruling families.  
Comuneros expect that future arrangements for REDD will be similar to the one that is 
in effect now for the timber revenues. All of the respondents have a strong preference for 
receiving direct payments to households and for the creation of a community fund to improve 
healthcare and education services. The Assembly has discussed this in meetings, but the way 
arrangements are made will depend on the negotiations that Bélgica will make with the Project 
Developer and financial institutions. However, if the benefit sharing arrangement chosen for 
REDD resembles the one that is in effect now, it runs the risk of reproducing inequality and 
exclusion.  
The Bélgica REDD+ Project and the Experience with AIDER (2011-to date) 
Negotiation of Entry and Consent  
The NGO AIDER—a non-profit organization that provides technical assistance to rural 
communities for sustainable forest management and is currently developing REDD projects—
arrived in the community by the invitation of the President, the Legal Advisor, and the 
Facilitator shortly after the agreement with Asesorandes was dissolved. AIDER’s directors 
visited Bélgica to meet with the comuneros and to discuss with them the terms of an 
agreement for completing the identification phase. After a short period of deliberation 
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between the Community Council, the Community Assembly, the Facilitator, the Legal Advisor, 
and AIDER, the first agreement in which Bélgica gave consent was signed in October 2011.26 
Community members immediately demonstrated trust in AIDER because it is known in the 
region for having led other REDD+ projects and for having the endorsement of the Legal Adviser 
and the Facilitator.  
Activities and Development of the Project       
According to the agreement narrative, the reinvented Bélgica REDD+ Project seeks to 
add value to the community’s forests (which are already under FSC standards) in order to 
provide Bélgica with additional income. AIDER’s agreed is to visit the community at least every 
two months and to provide comuneros with information and training. The Comuneros’ agreed 
to collaborate with the team, providing all the necessary information and support for the 
making of the Project Document Design (PDD). This time, as opposed to their experience with 
Asesorandes, Bélgica will not be charged for the cost of these studies and documents.27  
Respondents mentioned to have a good relationship with AIDER. Community members 
feel safe because they do not have to deal with an intermediary or bear the costs of the PDD. 
They say to trust AIDER because—in their opinion—it is working fast, giving them good training, 
providing transparent information, and helping them to find potential buyers. Comuneros have 
high expectations for AIDER and the project in general.  
On behalf of AIDER, the team members working in Bélgica mentioned that the 
community cooperates to ensure a “good development” of the project. Comuneros provide 
information by participating in workshops, focus groups, and individual interviews. They also 
join AIDER in their field visits in the forest and help them in both data and sample collecting for 
the Carbon Stock Inventory. However, AIDER’s team worries about the high expectations that 
could turn into future disappointment if things did not come out as expected (considering that 
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 “Convenio Marco de Cooperación Institucional entre AIDER y la Comunidad Nativa Bélgica” 
27
 No information was obtained on what will be the source for funding for these studies. 
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the carbon market is not regulated and is therefore highly speculative). The team stressed that 
their priority is to be transparent and inform Bélgica as much as possible. AIDER is committed to 
maintaining their reputation as the leading NGO of carbon projects in Peru.   
AIDER confirmed that their intervention in Bélgica will cease with the preparation of the 
PDD (approximately by December 2012) and its validation with VCS and CBB standards (anytime 
in 2013). Since AIDER will not engage as a broker in the future, part of the agreement is that it 
will find potential investors with whom Bélgica can directly negotiate. One candidate is the 
Althelia Climate Fund. Althelia is an investment fund registered under the laws of Luxembourg 
and whose main objective is to provide financial and technical resources to high-quality REDD+ 
projects and generate tradable emission reductions. This institution was introduced by AIDER as 
the potential investors in the Bélgica REDD+ Project. After overcoming a few obstacles, AIDER 
and Althelia signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in which both agreed to explore 
and further identify opportunities to develop and implement projects that will serve to address 
the impacts and economic costs of climate change, the subsequent adaptations to climate 
change, and capacity building within Peruvian communities.28  
During the second half of 2011, the “Bélgica REDD+ Project” had finished the 
identification phase and continued into the feasibility stage. AIDER sought Bélgica’s consent 
again and informed the community of the upcoming steps in this phase at a community 
meeting (with the intervention of the Directors of AIDER, the community, the Facilitator, and 
the Legal Adviser). Comuneros mention that their Legal Adviser suggested that this was a good 
chance to successfully engage in REDD+, given that Althelia and AIDER are trustworthy entities. 
Althelia is better known among the comuneros as “the French,” since the fund is financed by 
BNP – a financial institution established in France. Respondents are not familiar with the nature 
of “the French” other than being “the group that will negotiate the carbon credits.” This raises 
doubt on how well informed the comuneros were prior to giving their consent.  
                                                          
28
 According to the “Memorandum of Understanding” by and between, Asociación para la Investigación y 
Desarrollo Integral (AIDER) and the Althelia Climate Fund GP, dated February 21, 2012. 
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During the 17th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 17) held in Durban in 
December 2011, delegates of AIDESEP stated that “REDD+ projects in Peru are not transparent 
and are not applying adequate FPIC processes to the detriment of native peoples29.” This 
statement caused investors of the Althelia Climate Fund to immediately halt the signing of 
agreements in Peru until a thorough evaluation of how the FPIC processes in the communities 
are made. Immediately after, AIDER’s interdisciplinary team arranged a visit to the community 
with a number of objectives. The first objective was to instruct the comuneros in concepts such 
as Carbon Credits and REDD+ Projects and to discuss potential social and economic impacts. 
The second objective was to discuss the progress of the Carbon Stock Inventory started in 
November 2011. The third and last objective was to present and discuss a method to study local 
livelihoods.30 It is likely that the results of this visit were shared with Althelia to show that the 
process by which comuneros are informed and give consent was being properly developed by 
AIDER. Thus, in February of 2012, the MoU between AIDER and Althelia was finally signed and 
Bélgica was included as a pilot community for REDD+ to start the feasibility phase. A visit by 
representatives of this fund was scheduled for August 2012, after fieldwork for this 
investigation was finished. 
By the end of fieldwork, the project activities were undergoing some adjustments. 
AIDER officials where designing new communication strategies after they found out that the 
knowledge in regards to REDD+ and the preparatory activities were insufficient  and inaccurate 
and that expectations were too high. For instance, the idea that REDD would bring in large 
amounts of money was rooted in most of the comuneros. AIDER decided that it was necessary 
for them to explain to the community how the carbon market works and how the price of 
carbon can vary due to the lack of regulation of the voluntary market. Bélgica’s high 
expectations are fueled by the experience of MADERYJA’s REDD project that sold carbon credits 
for USD$7 per metric ton.  According to AIDER, comuneros ignore the fact that the price of 
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 Extracted from a letter AIDER sent to Belgica in December 2011, right after the COP 17 finished. 
30
 For details on the activities and results of this visit see AIDER’s: “Memoria de las actividades realizadas en la 
Comunidad Nativa Bélgica, en el marco del proceso de implementación de un proyecto REDD+” (December, 2011). 
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carbon came down to as low as USD$2 in July 2012.  Also, as part of the feasibility phase, AIDER 
was working to define a REDD+ strategy in the community, which has to be done with local 
participation. The REDD+ strategy includes a series of complementary activities that will provide 
community members with incentives to improve their livelihoods and to meet the goal of 
avoiding deforestation. Comuneros planned to continue with the production of handicrafts and 
rubber while also continuing to receive their salaries from MADERYJA.   
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CHAPTER 4 
THE NATIVE COMMUNITY OF INFIERNO: RUBBER, ECOTOURISM AND CARBON 
Introduction 
Infierno is located in the province of Tambopata, Region of Madre de Dios, and is 
identified by conservationists as a “biodiversity hotspot.” It is distributed along both banks of 
the Tambopata River, in the buffer zone of the Tambopata National Reserve and the Bahuaja 
Sonene National Park. Because of its strategic location and its biological and cultural diversity, 
Infierno has been targeted by many developmental interventions in addition to serving as a 
meeting point for researchers and students conducting field research (AIDER, 2012). 
It is said that the name of the community originated when a man cried out “vivir aquí es 
imposible, esto es un infierno! [Living here is impossible, this is hell!].” During the early 
twentieth century, “Infierno” evoked the idea of punishment and suffering during the afterlife 
in the minds of the first settlers of the Low Tambopata River. They struggled to adapt to a life in 
the forests, enduring high temperatures and coexisting with unknown and often dangerous 
beasts. Today, that image of Infierno is only anecdotal as the community now evokes the idea 
of indulgence and enjoyment to visitors coming from all around the world in search of a close 
encounter with nature. What Infierno really is and what it endeavors to become is caught in an 
in-between. It is a land where three cultures mixed and evolved together along with the 
intervention of the state, the catholic missions, the development agencies, conservation 
organizations, and the private companies.  
This chapter tells the story of Infierno, with a focus in the formation of the community 
and the mix of the three social groups that comprise it. Here, I pay special attention to their 
experience in the field of tourism, which has become a paradigm of the successful negotiation, 
consent, implementation, and development of projects to the people of Infierno (Stronza, 
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2010). Next, this chapter turns to the description of the negotiation process of entry, consent, 
and implementation of the preparatory activities for REDD+.   
Brief History of the Community 
The Ese Eja is an ethnic group that belongs to the linguistic family of the Takana, which 
had been historically scattered in the southern part of the region along the Tambopata River 
(“Bawuaja” in the Ese Eja language), the Beni River (now in Bolivia), and the lower Madre de 
Dios. They relied on hunting and gathering for survival and had sporadic contact with Andean 
populations, with whom they traded feathers, honey, and live animals for axes and knives 
(Alexiades, 1999).  This relative isolation came to an end with the arrival of the Rubber Boom 
during the first decade of the twentieth century. Relations between them, the market, and the 
State intensified (Alexiades, 2009), but a demographic debacle followed as a result of abuse, 
raids, and contact with masses of incoming laborers (Alexiades, 1999). Many Ese Eja moved to 
the headwaters of the Tambopata to hide, while others positioned themselves along waterways 
and developed commercial relations with the rubber tappers.  In the 1920s, the Dominicans 
established missionary settlements that became important centers where the Ese Eja mixed 
with other ethnic groups and formed a hybrid local culture. However, after some violent 
events, two missions were closed (Stronza, 2000). Some natives were regrouped, while others 
escaped and formed their own villages (IBC, 2001). Between the 1940s and 1960s, the 
settlements that gathered the first inhabitants—who later formed Infierno—started to develop. 
Two Ese Eja settlements—Hermosa Grande and Chonta—from along the Tambopata merged 
when Hermosa Grande hosted people from Chonta after a severe flood washed away their 
dwellings (IBC, 2001) (a map of the community is found in Anex A). A few kilometers down the 
river was Infierno, inhabited by families of “Ribereños” (meaning “riverside dwellers”) – who 
are the mestizo descendants of the first migrants during the rubber boom (AIDER, 2010).  
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During the decade of the 1970s, the role of the State through the National System for 
Social Mobilization (SINAMOS)31 played and essential role in grouping the Ese Eja and ribereños 
living along the Tambopata into demarcated territories. Both Hermosa Grande and Infierno 
were in need of a primary school, but neither of them complied with the minimum requirement 
of gathering twenty families to be eligible to receive State benefits. Officials from SINAMOS 
visited the ribereños of Infierno and proposed them the creation of a Native Community by 
taking advantage of the presence of the Ese Eja. Thereby, the ribereños convinced the Ese Ejas 
to move into Infierno. During a public meeting, the establishment of the community of Infierno 
was agreed upon by both groups – becoming the first Native Community in Madre de Dios to 
include non-indigenous citizens. In 1976, Infierno was recognized with a demarcated area of 
9,518 hectares that were to be communally owned.32 In order to prevent conflict due to 
cultural differences between the two groups, it was agreed that the Ese Eja would live on the 
right margin of the river, while the ribereños would stay on the left (Stronza, 2000; Alexiades, 
1999; IBC, 2001). All of the comuneros of Infierno, but especially the natives, continued to 
perform their traditional activities (hunting, gathering and fishing) in the customary Ese Eja 
territory, which extended beyond the borders of the title and which currently is the Tambopata 
National Reserve (RNT).  
By the end of the 1960s and during the first years of the 1970s, Madre de Dios received 
an infusion of Andean migrants in a state-led process of occupation of the Amazon. A number 
of them came to Infierno, became comuneros, and were given the right to work a piece of land 
and to access and use the common resources of the community. The majority of them settled 
in Cascajal in the north part of Infierno (Stronza, 2000; IBC, 2001). A few years later, during the 
tenure of an Andean President of Infierno, some families moved out of the community and left 
their farms behind. The President of the community facilitated the entry of many Andean 
families to occupy those parcels. The relations between the Andeans and the Ese Eja did not 
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 SINAMOS stands for “National System for Social Mobilization”. 
32
 The Community of Infierno was officially recognized by Director Resolution N° 61-OAJAFORAMS-VII-76 on April 
20
th
, 1976 by the Sub Regional Directorate of Agriculture. However, up to the time of this research, it had not been 
registered in the Public Registry in order to receive the land title and the title of use agreement.  
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develop smoothly, as the elder natives blamed this group for cutting the forest for the 
expansion of agriculture and illegal logging.  
In the early 1980s, the Tambopata area started becoming a popular destination for 
tourism as a result of its biological and cultural diversity. A company named Peruvian Safaris 
was granted a tourism concession in an area that overlapped Ese Eja customary territory. Both 
the company and the community signed a cooperation agreement that was finished later only 
after a breach and a territorial dispute. In 1996, the arrival of ecotourism marked the beginning 
of a new episode in the history of the community. Infierno established a long-term partnership 
with Rainforest Expeditions and formed the Ke’eway Association for the construction and 
administration of a world-class ecolodge named Posada Amazonas. In the years that followed, 
Infierno not only gained a place in the market of tourism, but also modified its socio-political 
organization (Stronza, 2010).  
Authority Structure, Powers and Rules for Social Order  
Just like in the case of Bélgica, Infierno’s political and authority structures have been 
created in accordance to the regulations of the Law of Native Communities of 1974 and have 
incorporated civil society organizations representing particular interests within the community. 
Thus, Infierno is represented by a Community Council and a Community, and also by civil 
society organizations that are mostly related to the ecotourism activity. The Control 
Committee, which was especially created in the context of the ecotourism project, has gained 
political power and technical expertise, and has become an important body of local 
governance. This section provides a description of the main features, functions and the 
relationships between the community members, the core institutions, and the civil society 
organizations.  
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Authority Structure and Powers 
The main governing institution of Infierno is the Community Council. It is a five-person 
body elected every two years by the community to represent the collectivity in public actions 
and in negotiations with the government, non-governmental institutions, and FENAMAD (the 
indigenous federation). The Council is in charge of enforcing the rules for social order and for 
the use of the natural resources. It is composed of a President, a Secretary, a Treasurer, and 
two members at-large who are accountable to the Community Assembly. Only the President 
receives a salary in compensation for leaving his33 personal affairs behind the scenes (his family, 
his farm, or work at the lodge). Aspirants to these positions run in an election campaign and are 
then elected by the Community Assembly. In the last thirteen years, the Presidents have been 
either ribereño or Ese Eja – but not Andean, mainly because the ribereño and Ese Eja family 
clans are more numerous and have more cohesive relationships, in addition to the fact that the 
Andeans are a minority. The members of the Council may be removed from office by the 
Assembly in the event of proven lack of transparency, corruption, or unresponsiveness. This has 
actually occurred in the past, according to some of the respondents. However, the process of 
removing an authority may be difficult, as the family clans tend to protect and advocate for 
their members. 
The Community Assembly is the main deliberative body, constituted by all the members 
that are registered in the Register of Inhabitants. The Assembly holds monthly ordinary 
meetings to discuss community affairs, especially in regards to the progress of the lodge. 
Meetings can extend for many hours and debate can turn heated, especially when discussing 
the investment of resources or the sanctions of community members for wrongdoing and 
violation of community rules. Decisions are reached by a vote. Attendance at meetings is 
mandatory for all community members, however when a comunero or comunera cannot 
attend (because is either working at the lodge or in the city), the spouse can represent them to 
avoid the non-attendance fine. Not all decisions are made by the Assembly; some are directly 
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 There is no history of female members in the council.  
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made by the Council according to its mandate. The minutes from all meetings are recorded in a 
logbook. 
The Committee of Control is a civil society organization that was born in the context of 
the ecotourism project. It was elected by the first members of the Ke’eway association and  was 
initially composed by ten volunteer members. The role of the committee was to inform the 
members about the progress of the lodge, the finances, human resources affairs and 
management decisions (Stronza, 2000.) Currently, the committee is composed of a permanent 
Directory Board—President, Secretary, Treasurer, and two members (one of them is part of the 
Council)—and five substitute members. The Board members receive a salary of 1,000 Nuevo 
Soles (approximately USD$ 400). Only the President is changed every two years, while the rest 
of the members are evaluated by the committee itself and are allowed to stay if they pass the 
evaluation. Both the election of the President and the evaluation of the members are 
performed by the Committee (one of whom is a member of the Community Council).  Members 
of the Board argue that frequent rotation would interrupt and prevent the group from gaining 
knowledge and experience in project management. However, this is still an unusual 
arrangement that poses a conflict of interest as the Committee is not likely to punish itself. 
The Committee represents the particular interests of the members of the Ke’eway 
Association (discussed further in this chapter). The Committee is in charge of supervising, 
evaluating, and controlling both compliance with the contract and the finances of the 
Association. The Committee reports the finances, changes in infrastructure, human resources, 
and the administration of Posada Amazonas to the Council and the Assembly with the objective 
of protecting the interests of the members. The Committee also mediates conflict between the 
company and the community. The Board has been trained in basic accounting in order to 
supervise the books of revenue and expenses. Throughout the year, the Committee of Control 
reports the progress of Posada in almost every Assembly meeting. Furthermore, every July, the 
Committee presents a consolidated report of revenues and expenses; the revenue is 
subsequently distributed every year in August. Starting in 2012, the Community Council — in a 
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joint effort with the Committee — has also been participating in the supervision, elaboration, 
and presentation of the report in order to improve transparency. It is currently known as the 
“Committee of Projects Control” because its responsibilities have been extended into the 
supervision of other projects.  
There are other committees in existence that function as small business enterprises 
dedicated to providing goods and services and to harvesting fruits from the forests (Brazil nuts 
and “aguaje,” the fruit of the “agujales” palm tree). The Committee of Artisans and the 
Committee of Boatyards have exclusivity agreements with Posada Amazonas to sell handicrafts 
and to provide transportation for tourists traveling from Infierno to the lodge.  The Committee 
of Brazil Nuts and the Aguaje Harvest Committee were formed in the context of projects for 
sustainable forest use in order to provide members with additional income. According to the 
community’s rules, all of these committees have to pay 5% of their income to the community 
(through the Council). However, the committees usually circumvent this rule.   
Also born out of the context of the ecotourism project, the figure of the Project 
Coordinator is nowadays probably the most strategic and polemic position in the community. 
While this person does not have the powers of an authority, he acts as an Adviser. He gives 
technical assistance and counseling and is involved in most of the actions executed by the 
Council and the Committee of Control. This person is in charge of representing the community 
in the management and assessment of the ecotourism project and of increasing and 
diversifying Infierno’s project portfolio. The current coordinator was the President of the 
Committee of Control between 2008 and 2009. Up until 2010 the position of Project 
Coordinator had been filled by an external professional, who used to be selected and hired by 
Rainforest Expeditions and paid by the Ke’eway Association. However, since the comuneros 
(who are members of the Association) complained that the former Coordinator “leaned more 
to the company’s side” and did not look after the interests of the community, they agreed to 
make a change. Thus, in 2010, the members of the association agreed to start a selection 
process to hire a community member that will serve as a Project Coordinator. This is how the 
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current Coordinator was appointed. He receives a wage34 and reports to the community.  The 
Coordinator’s brother is the current President of the Community Council and they work 
together very closely. They both belong to a powerful family clan descended from the first 
ribereño settlers in Infierno.  
One other important political institution for the community of Infierno is FENAMAD; the 
community has been part of this indigenous organization since 1982. FENAMAD represents 
Infierno at the national level for any actions taken by the indigenous movement led by AIDESEP 
and has been instrumental in helping Infierno during the process of titling, during the 
establishment of new authorities and rules, and whenever they need to register the new 
Council in the Public Registry. FENAMAD also facilitates contact with governmental institutions 
and non-governmental organizations, attracting economic resources and technical assistance. 
Two community members from one of the Ese Eja clans are former Presidents and authorities 
of FENAMAD, with whom the federation continues to have a close relationship. These members 
pass political positions within the national indigenous movement on to the community (this is 
further developed in the next section, where I discuss the arrival of REDD+ and one sector of 
the population’s opposition to it). Nowadays, Infierno and FENAMAD are distant and most of 
the community members and authorities argue that FENAMAD no longer represents them. 
Current FENAMAD leaders are Harakmbut (another indigenous group located in the Madre de 
Dios region) and are more focused on the defense of some Harakmbut who are involved in 
illegal gold mining in Los Amigos River, which is a high-impact problem in the region. 
Community members of Infierno feel mostly ignored by the organization and have even 
discussed the possibility of withdrawing and forming their own organization along with other 
communities of the Tambopata River.  
Infierno lies in the jurisdiction of the District  of Tambopata in the Province of the same 
name According to comuneros and the Council, their relationship with the District Municipality 
is limited to their attendance to the Participatory Budget Meeting where the community 
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 Information on the amount of the wage was not revealed. 
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presents project ideas based on the needs of the community. However, many of their petitions 
are ignored and filed by the District Municipality due to its almost permanent lack of funds. 
Comuneros have more communication with the Regional Government, which oversees the 
sectors of agriculture and forestry. Comuneros appeal to the Regional Directorate of Agriculture 
when they require technical assistance for agricultural production or need to complete the 
process of land titling for the community.  Comuneros also petition the Regional Executive 
Directorate of Forestry and Wildlife to obtain permits for timber extraction and concessions 
over non-timber forest products.  
Rules for Social Order 
People born in Infierno automatically become “comuneros” when turning eighteen 
years of age. Up until the year 2006, the rules for becoming a community member for 
newcomers were relatively simple. A candidate was required to write a request to the 
Community Assembly, to participate in collective work, and to be under probation for one year 
until granted admission. Along with membership, the new comunero was granted access to the 
common resources and received an area for farming. New comuneros also received the right to 
become members of the Ke’eway Association and acquired responsibilities such as: attending 
the meetings, maintaining good behavior, and participating in collective work – which consisted 
of short-term activities (such as cutting the grass and cleaning the roads) in which all or groups 
of comuneros participate. The rules for the incorporation of newcomers have turned more 
complex in the recent years (Stronza, 2010). For instance, community delegates established 
that new comuneros cannot become members of the Ke’eway Association anymore, which was 
one of the main reasons why outsiders wanted to obtain membership in the first place. The 
association has decided not to incorporate more members since it reached its limit of 154 
members, because otherwise revenues would become too small to be significant to the 
members.  
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The rules for social order have been made collectively and gradually since the formation 
of the community and have been adapted to the needs and evolution of Infierno. These rules 
are included in the Community Statues and are legally registered in the Public Registries. They 
establish the rights and responsibilities of the community members, the powers and duties of 
the authorities, and procedures for elections, among others. Upon the arrival of the ecotourism 
project, the statutes were changed with the help of the legal adviser in order to include some 
rules in regards to Infierno’s partnership with the tour operator. Until 1996, the suggested 
template of the Public Registries for indigenous communities’ statutes did not take into 
consideration the creation of a partnership between a native community and a private 
company. The establishment of these rules were carefully debated and agreed on by the 
Assembly. According to the members of the Council, once the community has finalized the 
preparation for REDD, the statutes will need to be modified again in order to formalize new 
rules made in regards the benefit sharing arrangement and new rules for  the use of forests (for 
new rules for REDD in Infierno see Chapter 5.)  
Besides the statutes, separate sets of regulations have also been written in regards to 
specific issues. For instance, there are rules for use of the communal territory and the forest 
concession. Rules for the use of the territory within the community have been established in 
response to the increase in the population, with their demand for land and the pressure they 
impose over the bordering Tambopata National Reserve (RNT). The population continues to 
perform traditional activities inside the reserve, which is currently limited by rules established 
by the National Service of Natural Protected Areas (SERNAP). Efforts by the community, non-
profit organizations, and research organizations have been made in order to limit people’s 
access into the reserve in order to decrease logging, hunting and, cutting of the fruit (“aguajes”) 
from palm trees (“aguajales”). In the case of the forest concession, there is a set of rules that 
detail what is and is not allowed for every type of visitor: community members, guides, and 
tourists. 
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In cases like land allocation, rules are still not written in the Statutes, but are discussed 
and set by the Assembly and executed and enforced by the Council. Land allocation rules have 
changed over time according to the availability of land in the community, which is decreasing. 
Every time the rules are adjusted or modified —mainly in terms of general location of new plots 
and size— they are recorded in the community logbook. The Council has the power to establish 
the specific location and extension of the land, which varies depending on the characteristics of 
the terrain. Land is communally owned and all community members have the right to receive 
one piece of land for farming, but community members will only maintain the right to it if they 
work the land. Rules indicate how to proceed in case of a death or if a comunero leaves, but 
when cases present complexities that go beyond the rules, these are discussed by the 
Assembly. Current rules for land allocation agreed on in 2010 have reduced the number of 
hectares from a maximum allocation of thirty to fifteen because the population is growing 
rapidly and there is not much land available for the upcoming generations. 
Ecotourism: Process of Negotiation and Consent for the Creation of the Ke’eway Association  
Amanda Stronza (2000) wrote an extraordinary ethnography about the experience of 
Ecotourism in Infierno during the implementation stage and first four years of operation, as 
well articles about the progress of the project and the resulting changes in the community over 
time (Stronza, 2010). I draw on her work and the qualitative data I gathered during my visit to 
the community in order to illustrate this process and further explain how this experience with 
Rainforest Expeditions (RFE) has greatly influenced the way authorities and people face the 
arrival of REDD+.  
Rainforest Expeditions (RFE) is a Peruvian tour operator established in 1989 by two 
partners. In the beginning, RFE’s efforts were oriented towards the development of a research 
station for the study of Macaws along the Tambopata River. Later in 1992, the station was 
opened to tourists with the aim of financing research activities and some comuneros from 
Infierno worked as research assistants (Gordillo, Hunt &  Stronza, 2008). In 1996, RFE offered to 
64 
 
form a twenty-year joint venture with Infierno – that later became known as the “Ke’eway 
Association in Participation” – with RFE in order to establish Posada Amazonas, an ecotourism 
lodge. Partners would split the profit (60% for Infierno, 40% to RFE) and share the responsibility 
for the decision making and management of the lodge. The initial investment would come from 
the company, a grant, and community labor (Stronza, 2010). The requirements to become a 
partner were to provide fifteen days of communal labor for one time only and to be eighteen or 
older.  
The process of obtaining consent was not easy as it faced both intense skepticism and 
the opposition of anthropologists and indigenous rights advocates. They feared that the 
company would reap all the benefits and dominate the community, that people would leave 
their traditional activities and become dependent on wages, and that irreversible changes 
would occur in Infierno’s traditional culture and institutions – resulting in a loss of identity and 
autonomy. Inside Infierno, however, the proposal was being given some thought, even though 
the positions were still mixed. Therefore, a group of Ese Eja leaders (who gave the initial 
support to RFE) soon began convincing other comuneros to consent the project. They decided 
to wear the hat of “promoters” and, along with a representative of RFE, visited every family to 
personally explain the exact terms and the implications of the project. In this informational 
campaign, they used pictures and drawings to illustrate how people could participate and 
benefit. Simultaneously, the Committee of Control was created to help the information 
campaign and acted as a bridge between the company and the community. Together, they 
convinced the majority and obtained consent for the construction of the lodge in 1996. Posada 
Amazons began operating in 1998. 
Over the last sixteen years, the development of Posada Amazonas has been well 
documented (IBC, 2001; Stronza, 2010). The Association has won many international awards 
and has been center of attention in the national and international media (Stronza, 2010). 
Posada Amazonas attracts 20% of the lodge market in Madre de Dios. In terms of the economic 
benefits for the community (and beyond the 60% share and the salaries the local staff that fill in 
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the positions of cooks, bartenders, boat drivers, receptionists, and guides), it has also boosted 
the sale of handicrafts and agricultural products.   
Benefit Sharing Arrangement  
The benefit-sharing system of the Ke’eway Association establishes a transparent 
distribution of the profit among the members of the association. It is supervised and informed 
by the Committee of Control with the aim of ensuring transparency and accountability to the 
members of the association. During a meeting every month, the Committee presents a report 
of the association’s finances, with a yearly report added in books every July. The payments are 
made to community members every August. During the meetings, the members discuss the 
progress of the finances and the use of the money. According to one of the beneficiaries of the 
association: “although not perfect, the system works, and if something is not clear, the 
members demand detailed explanations: if something is not right, they complain.” 
After having covered all the operational costs of Posada Amazonas—which includes 
local labor and other costs—RFE keeps 40% of the profits and the community keeps 60% that is 
divided among 154 members of the association. RFE’s share corresponds to the permanent 
labor it provides to the business.  Ke’eway members provide fifteen days labor as a 
requirement for obtaining membership. For instance, a member who entered the Association 
back in 1999 and worked for fifteen days that year helping  the construction of additional 
rooms for the lodge does not need to provide labor again. The responsibilities of the members 
include attending the Association’s meetings and participating in decision-making.   
A portion of the Association’s share (60%) is channeled to a fund that covers medical 
emergencies and education loans for higher education of youths -- that are paid back when the 
students enter the job market. The remaining 70%-80% of the Association’s share is distributed 
among the 154 participating families each year. In case a member has been fined in the course 
of the year, or has received a medical or student loan, the amount would be debited from his 
share and he would only be paid the balance. The profits and shares per family have increased 
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over time: from the equivalent of USD$150 in 2000 and USD$805 in 2007 (Stronza, 2010) up to 
USD$1,800 in 2011 (AIDER, 2012).  
Financial returns obtained from ecotourism have incentivized comuneros to organize 
and plan the management of common-pool resources (Stronza, 2010). One example is the 
establishment of the community forest reserve within 2,000 hectares of communal lands and 
the prohibition of any kind of activity that may disrupt the forest such as hunting, logging, and 
farming. The area is now kept as a forest garden for traditional plants. In 2003, Infierno applied 
for a forest concession (for ecotourism purpose) of 1,649 hectares to protect the surroundings 
of an oxbow lake that is part of their tours (and is under threat because of the construction of 
the Inter-Oceanic Highway that connects the Atlantic to the Pacific and passes through Brazil 
and Peru).  
These sixteen years of work have been a learning experience for both RFE and the 
people in Infierno. While the company has learned to negotiate with the community, the 
community learned that participation in the design and development of projects promotes 
better outcomes. The comuneros have gained better management capacity and have expanded 
their connections with non-profit organizations and aid organizations, who have awarded them 
grants for training and exchange trips to visit similar experiences in Africa, Asia, and the United 
States (Stronza, 2010). The communal organization has become stronger and more 
sophisticated as it has sought to increase efficiency at the same time as it was taking ownership 
of the project. They have created new bodies of governance, such as the Control Committee, 
and established new rules for the use of the forest and resources in order to protect their 
business.  
The partnership will expire in 2016 and, despite all the acquired experience and 
learning, the comuneros do not feel completely prepared for continuing with the business on 
their own. According to the respondents, they still depend on RFE’s international connections 
and experience in the international ecotourism market. Some of them argue that this lack of 
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ability is the result of a strategy by RFE to not transfer all the know-how of the business, while 
others argue that it is merely a result of a lack of the comuneros’ engagement in this aspect of 
the business. There is an ongoing debate on whether to extend the partnership with RFE or not. 
Provided that the Project gives an important amount of income to the members, they fear that 
this might be lost in case of mismanagement. 
There are also other alternatives that the comuneros and the authorities are exploring, 
such as starting their own eco-lodge. According to some members of the Committee of Control 
and the Council, Infierno is currently applying for funds and loans to make this project come to 
fruition. Up until the time of this fieldwork, they were holding conversations with funding 
agencies and gathering the required documentations. The new “product” (as they call it) will 
not directly compete with Posada Amazonas.35 The other alternative is to engage in a REDD+ 
project in order to receive payments for avoiding deforestation, which is the biggest threat for 
the community lands, household economies, and their ecotourism business.  In the next 
section, based on interviews with community authorities and community members, I describe 
the process of arrival of REDD+, the negotiation of entry, and the development of the feasibility 
stage.  
The Arrival of REDD+ in Infierno  
In 2008, the International Tropical Timber Organizations (ITTO)36 launched a competitive 
selection process to identify forest-dependent communities interested in establishing systems 
of Payments for Environmental Services (PES) as part of ITTO’s new thematic program named 
“Reducing Deforestation and Forest Degradation and Enhancing Environmental Services” 
(REDDES) in tropical countries. In Peru, the agency responsible for endorsing the selection of 
the pilot sites was the General Directorate of Forestry and Wildlife (DGFS) — a national level 
                                                          
35
 No further details were obtained from the interviewees as to how the products are different.  
36
 ITTO is “an intergovernmental organization promoting the conservation and sustainable management, use and 
trade of tropical forest resources.  It was established under the auspices of the United Nations in 1986 amidst 
increasing worldwide concern for the fate of tropical forests.” Source: http://www.itto.int/about_itto/ 
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institution appointed by the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAG)—with the assistance of local-
based NGOs such as AIDER, SPDA, and ACCA. These non-profit organizations are known by the 
population of Infierno for they have conducted conservation projects in the neighboring 
Tambopata National Reserve (RNT) in the past few years. 
Negotiation of Entry 
In early 2009, according to one of the ruling authorities, DGFS officials and ITTO staff 
visited Infierno in order to inform the Council that the community was being considered as a 
potential project site and to seek their consent for starting the identification phase. The project 
idea and information about the program were presented to the Community Assembly. A long 
discussion followed. Community members wanted to know in which ways this project would be 
helpful to the community. They discussed their concerns regarding unsecure tenure, 
deforestation, invasions by migrants (who were settling along the Inter-Oceanic Highway and 
penetrating close to the ecotourism concession), and the increasing presence of papaya tenant 
farmers (“papayeros”)  who are responsible for clearing the forest and degrading the soil in at 
least fifty hectares in the community. ITTO staff explained that if the studies confirmed that 
Infierno had potential for participating in PES programs, then they will receive funding for 
implementing the system and ITTO would help them tackle deforestation drivers. For instance, 
if selected to continue on to the feasibility stage, ITTO would assist them in finalizing the 
registration of the land title, which is the last step for clearing tenure and a requirement for 
establishing a PES system. When PES payments arrive in the future, they will be used in the 
administration of the ecotourism concession. A group of comuneros expressed deep concerns 
about the risks of losing control of their lands and restrictions for using forest resources. After 
the discussion, ITTO obtained the Assembly’s consent for the development of an identification 
study, to be carried out by New Forests Advisory Inc. – a consulting firm based in the United 
States – over a period of four months. The conclusion of the study revealed that Infierno has a 
great potential to benefit from a PES system based on the expansion of ecotourism activities 
and the implementation of a REDD+ project.   
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Some of the respondents have a critical point of view about how the selection process 
of the Project Developer was made. They state that the process was somewhat problematic for 
two reasons. First, the community had wanted to deal directly with the financer as was 
recommended in New Forest’s study. However, due to ITTO’s funding requirements, this was 
not possible (CI, 2012). Second, the community did not have a voice in the selection process. 
After an internal competition called by ITTO, in which at least other two NGOs presented their 
proposals, AIDER was selected to be the Project Developer without consultation or approval by 
Infierno. At the same time, FENAMAD tried to convince Infierno to designate the federation as 
the Project Developer, so it could ensure that their rights were respected and their livelihoods 
were not affected by REDD+. Notwithstanding, the federation did not gain the support of the 
community, as the majority thought that FENAMAD lacked the capacity and expertise to 
administrate REDD+ projects and that their only interest was to have control over the activities 
and the budget.  
Community members requested the revision of AIDER’s proposal and budget by the 
authorities and community members. Community members were disappointed about the 
amount of money that would go to cover the wages of the project officials and technicians, 
which is 32% of the total budget. However, this was compensated for by including a provision 
for infrastructure and equipment in the budget (a new community house and computers). 
Finally, ITTO managed to convince the Assembly to accept AIDER in a community meeting, 
based on the organization’s reputation and experience in conducting community based forest 
management and REDD projects in Peru, especially in the Region of Madre de Dios.37 Yet, up 
until today, some of the respondents still feel that they were not presented other alternatives 
and that AIDER’s participation was imposed.  
AIDER initiated activities in September 2010. The project “Sustainable forest 
management and utilization of ecosystem services in forests managed by the Ese'Eja native 
community” was established with a total budget of USD$ 523,319 (USD$ 356,519 is provided by 
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 AIDER is conducting at least seven different projects in the region. 
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ITTO and US$ 166,800 by AIDER). The main objective is to “strengthen community access to 
environmental services market to generate additional income that will help Infierno improve 
the management of the communal forest and the ecotourism concession.”38 The project 
promises to formalize rights to trade ecosystem services and to resolve existing land tenure 
conflicts in the concession area. 
Community members see REDD+ as an alternative to obtain the necessary funds and 
technical assistance to finish the process of clearing tenure, to implement the protection of the 
land and to provide a complementary economic benefit for their households. According to the 
local views, the main drivers of deforestation in the communal territory and the forest 
concession are: population growth, agricultural expansion, the Inter-Oceanic Highway, and 
illegal logging. First, agricultural expansion due to the increase of the local population and the 
demand for land is increasing pressure on the forest. Even though smaller areas are being given 
to new community members and rules have been set to limit the number of hectares allowed 
for clearing, less forest space is available year by year. Second, the presence of papaya tenant 
farmers, called “papayeros,” is becoming a serious threat due to a small group of community 
members who rent their land to papaya farmers. According to the authorities, the papayeros 
have almost cleared a total of 50 hectares. Since this activity has been growing, those renting 
land to the papayeros have begun demanding the construction of a new road inside communal 
territory to connect them to the Puerto Maldonado market. Authorities are working to 
eradicate the activity. Third, the Inter-Oceanic Highway, which is located north of the 
community territory, is attracting farmers and cattle ranchers along the route. They are 
penetrating into the forest, very close to the boundaries of Infierno, with one settler already 
inside the forest concession. The lack of monetary resources for the administration of the forest 
concession prevents the creation of a management plan or the installation of a surveillance 
system in order to stop invaders. Fourth and finally, some community members are extracting 
timber from their farms, the common forest area, and the forest reserve – despite it being 
                                                          
38
 As described in the project document by ITTO: red-pd 018/09 Rev.1 (F). 
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limited or prohibited. All of these are considered as priority problems to solve by the 
community members and their authorities.  
Development of the project 
The project has four components and products (ITTO, 2009) that have been in progress 
contemporaneously between September 2010 and July 2012. The first component was to 
achieve community consensus in regards to the formulation of priority actions for forest 
management, to prepare a social and economic baseline, and to provide infrastructure and 
training for supporting the process. This component included the construction of an office and 
the provision of computers and internet connection for the authorities and leaders. Up until the 
time of fieldwork, the social and economic baseline and the forest management plan were 
ready. The forest management plan included a series of actions that AIDER and the community 
are already pushing forward – for instance, the construction and implementation of a nursery 
for tree seedling production for reforestation purposes. However, the construction of the office 
and the internet connection were still pending. This delay was generating complaints by the 
community members, as it is seen as a broken promise. The second component was a study to 
determine the status of the communal rights over land and the resources in the communal 
lands and forest concession, which is complete, as well as the participation of the community 
authorities in the creation process of a national PES policy. The third and fourth components 
were the insertion of Infierno into a REDD+ scheme, which requires the preparation of a carbon 
stock baseline and the elaboration of the Project Design Document (PDD). The PDD was due in 
December 2012 for validation during 2013 by VCS or CCBA.   
All the components had been advancing steadily between 2010 and 2012. These 
preparatory activities have elicited reactions in the locals and influenced changes in the rules of 
the use of the territory and the resources in preparation for the implementation phase. 
According to the members of the Council, there have been delays in and miscommunication 
about some of the activities. The Council, on behalf of the population, is demanding 
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adjustments from AIDER. One of the most important is a change in the communication strategy, 
because attendance at the meetings is somewhat low.  All community members and authorities 
agree that the information process for the project should be continuous and be made 
household by household, following the model imposed by the Ecotourism project sixteen years 
ago. Another issue that is being observed by the locals is the lack of involvement of local labor 
in the project’s activities. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS 
This section is dedicated to exploring in greater detail the main aspects of local 
governance in the face of REDD+. It is structured according to the research questions posed in 
Chapter 1. These questions focus on the mechanisms of consent, participation, and 
representation as well as on the identification of changes in rules and institutions in the village 
resulting from REDD+. The information provided in these sections was gathered from the 
interviews mainly with community authorities, community members, and NGO officials.  
Bélgica  
Consent: Understanding, Motivations and Expectations 
Bélgica gave consent for REDD+ during two occasions. In both instances, decisions were 
made by the Assembly in public meetings after a long discussion among all community 
members. One comunero reports:  
It was three years ago when this business man proposed us to sell him a piece of land for 
him to cut. We didn’t accept. Then he came up with this idea of a “carbon project” and 
brought Asesorandes to explain to us what it was about. The President (of the 
community) traveled to Lima to meet with the NGO. Then they came to the community 
and here (the communal house) we discussed the proposal. The President said that it 
was a good opportunity for us, so we decided to give it a try. We all agreed and 
Asesorandes started working almost immediately. 
As it was mentioned in Chapter 3, there was a pre-existing relationship with the project 
proponents who saw a business opportunity in Bélgica and used that relationship, and already 
existent trust to obtain the community’s consent. 
According to the comuneros, the process by which the community was informed 
included only “two or three” meetings to explain what the offer entailed. They felt that the 
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information they received was confusing because it included terms and concepts they had 
never heard before: “carbon sequestration,” “carbon emissions,” and “carbon credits.” Most of 
the comuneros justify their lack of knowledge or understanding of the terms by making 
reference to their educational level. Some are illiterate or did not finish school. However, 
despite the lack of understanding of the technical aspects of projects in general, the offer was 
still appealing since it promised to generate additional income for the households and to 
improve communal infrastructure. It also included the development of a forest management 
plan and to apply for certification, which could increase the value of their timber while using 
the forest responsibly.  In their second—and ongoing—attempt to enter in REDD+, the process 
of negotiation of entry and consent has also been quick and it was done through the regular 
communal procedures: the assembly voted and granted consent during a community meeting.   
When prompted about their motivations to accept REDD+ and their expectations from 
the project, they all provided the same reasons: potential benefits at both the household and 
communal level. None of the comuneros were motivated by the climate goals. Although there 
is no way to have a clear sense of the amount, they expect that this extra income would at least 
help them improve their material comfort at the household level. The comuneros would use it 
to send their children to secondary school in the city and to be able to afford their 
accommodation and study materials. They also would buy motorcycles and gasoline to facilitate 
their transportation to Iñapari and they would be able to buy food, since they are already 
producing fewer goods at their farms. The benefits at the communal level would allow them to 
improve education and health services in the village. First, they would have enough income to 
hire a permanent nurse to stay in the community. Second, they would pay for a better teacher 
and to improve the primary school’s infrastructure. The comuneros would also improve the 
road that connects the community to the city of Iñapari, since the district authority does not 
fulfill its promises in this matter.  
Comuneros state that they feel more satisfied with the information process with AIDER 
than with Asesorandes. They say that they have great expectations from AIDER because it is 
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very straightforward and transparent when presenting information about the project. Their 
relationship with the Project Developer is excellent so far. However, the comuneros’ 
expectation concern AIDER staff as they want to be very careful and not raise false hopes for 
and subsequent disappointment from the population.  
People’s understanding of the project has been inaccurate to a certain extent. Looking 
back into their first experience, the community realizes that they were not completely informed 
regarding important aspects of the project – for instance, the project’s finances and the 
timeframe for receiving. They did not realize that the project could take more than two years. 
In addition, they were not aware that the expenses in the execution of the activities were going 
to be paid by the community once the carbon credits were sold, and that Asesorandes was 
going to claim a disproportionate share of the carbon revenues. Had they known this, some say 
they probably would not have consented. However, inaccuracies persist now that the Project 
Developer is AIDER, especially in regards to the finances for the implementation of REDD. For 
instance, the comuneros do not know that there is a cost to carbon credits validation once 
engaged in REDD and they are not sure whether they need to pay AIDER for their services at the 
end of the project. Looking at both experiences, it can be asserted that the information 
comuneros received during their first experience was less detailed and was restricted to the 
technical aspects of carbon sequestration and climate change. Despite the efforts made by 
AIDER in educating the locals in regards to REDD, knowledge continues to be concentrated in 
current President of the community and the Facilitator.  
All respondents agree that they never thought the project would entail any negative or 
inconvenient outcome to them, such as benefiting less than the project developer. In their 
opinion, the President of the community -who is a knowledgeable a well-respected authority- 
with the support of the community facilitator, had hold a series of meetings with the 
proponents to make sure that the proposal was not only formal and did not pose risks for the 
population and the territory, but also was a unique business opportunity. They also report that 
during all the processes, there has not been any case of opposition or anti-REDD+ discourse.  
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Representation, Responsiveness and Accountability of the Authority 
Bélgica people are represented by the President of the community in all negotiations 
and processes involving any type of intervention – including REDD. For instance, the President 
guided the community in the negotiations with the first logging companies that came to Bélgica 
early in the 2000s, including MADERYJA, Asesorandes, and AIDER. The President influences the 
decision-making process by presenting ideas at the meetings (with the help of the Facilitator). 
The President greatly relies on the advice of the Facilitator and the Legal Adviser, more so than 
on the rest of the members of the Council. In some cases, the Facilitator even represents the 
community in workshops and meetings. The other authorities seem not to have enough power 
or initiative to contest the President’s authority or to express disagreement on this matter. The 
President has been of great help and support to private and public organizations that have 
approached the community for different purposes – such as establishing contracts for timber 
extraction and production projects, among others. Inside and outside of Bélgica, the President’s 
authority is accepted and respected as he is considered the eldest, the most knowledgeable, 
and the most experienced person of the community. In the community, kinship is an important 
factor in the legitimacy of his authority. This President is a direct relative to an important 
number of the community members. He has been elected President for four periods already—
the last two consecutively—and was running for election again in 2013. In the face of the arrival 
of REDD+, and greatly influenced by the opinion of the Legal Adviser and the Facilitator, 
comuneros are discussing the possibility of declaring him President permanently in order to 
ensure the stability and good development of the project. Comuneros consider that the “good 
results” that the community is obtaining from the projects in which they have engaged so far 
are a result of his excellent managerial skills and his charismatic personality.  
Public reporting of the activities of the President and the Secretary is done on regular 
basis through ordinary and extraordinary meetings. However, in terms of the finances, 
reporting is poorly done and is not transparent. The Treasurer and the President, who jointly 
manage the funds, do not provide accurate reports on the community’s earnings and expenses. 
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Comuneros state that they know how the money from the timber is used, but ignore the 
numbers. However, very few of them seemed concerned about this situation, but argued that 
the Treasurer does not know how to make a report, however adding that he and the President 
are honest and trustworthy persons.  
According to the majority of the respondents, the rules for benefit sharing of timber 
royalties are governed by the Council and directed by the President, despite the existence of 
orally stated rules that were discussed and approved by the Assembly. The President decides 
the amount of the salary people will receive depending on his social status and the individual’s 
behavior in the community. The President also decides in which cases to make exceptions to 
increase or decrease the amount of a salary.  
Bélgica’s relationship with the District Municipality and its indigenous federation is very 
limited. They do not intervene in any aspect of the community governance, not even since the 
arrival of REDD+ to the region. District Municipalities do not have any jurisdiction over forestry 
or land. These are instead regulated by the Regional Governments and the sectors. In the 
specific case of REDD (since this is a pilot project aimed to the voluntary market), the State has 
limited involvement. Also, the current relationship with FENAMAD—the region’s indigenous 
federation—is very distant. Although Bélgica is still affiliated with the federation, the contact is 
minimal – which can explain to some extent why the anti-REDD+ discourse is not present in the 
community.  
Results show that representation in Bélgica is not democratic, for the regime responds 
poorly and is not accountable to the people. However, the people do not sanction the 
authorities in terms of accountability for resources controlled by the Council. In terms of 
responsiveness, the authorities only translate some of the local needs into actions – for 
instance, the establishment of a benefit sharing system on which all community members 
depend. However, this system lacks equity because it marginalizes both women and those 
families that are not related to the ruling authorities.  Comuneros are aware of the salary scale 
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because it was discussed and approved in a meeting. But, they seem to be unaware of the 
amounts of the salaries paid in practice. Some examples of the Council’s actions that have 
demonstrated limited accountability are: (1) the lack of reporting on and transparency of 
community expenses and the Council’s actions, (2) the lack of compliance to the orally stated 
benefit sharing rules, and (3) the establishment of severe rules that restrict comuneros’ 
individual freedoms. The community statutes even give power to the President for making 
decisions on his own and only later explaining the reasons for these decisions. Even more 
seriously, irregularities have been found in the management of the community, the funds, and 
the appointing the current President for permanent office – which is not endorsed by any 
Peruvian law. Comuneros see these actions as not being right but still accept them. It seems 
that Bélgica has a tradition of existing under authoritative figures guiding their actions – first, 
the rubber patrons and then, the timber companies and Facilitators. The justification for this 
passive behavior is that they do not have enough education to engage in negotiations with 
outsiders and, therefore, they delegate these responsibilities to the educated ones in the 
community.  
Participation and Control of the Process 
Local participation in project activities has been limited to the local people attending 
meetings and workshops where comuneros learn about carbon, climate change, and forest 
management. Men and women attend the community meetings not only to comply with 
Bélgica’s rules for social order (and to avoid fines imposed on absentees), but also because the 
REDD+ project is of interest to the people. They also “participate” in the feasibility studies in 
the field by assisting the team of biologists in the collection of soil samples.  
Local people do not engage in the design of the project’s activities or actively participate 
in decision making, particularly in their experience with Asesorandes.  According to the 
respondents, they have mostly accepted all the proposed activities by the project proponents. 
The projects are pre-designed and people only participate by approving or disapproving an 
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action. People participate in the debates during the community meetings, but in the end their 
voices are not binding for decision making in regards to the development of project activities. 
The President’s opinion is highly influential. If he supports a cause, then the rest of the 
community does too. In turn, the President relies on the Facilitator and the Legal Adviser for 
advice, so most of the decisions that the President makes are influenced by these two advisers. 
According to all the respondents, they did not have any control of the process of 
preparation for REDD in their experience with Asesorandes. The terms of the project, the 
activities, and even the benefit sharing agreement between the community and the company 
was designed by Asesorandes.  This motivated the community’s internal disagreement because 
their opinions were not considered and they felt under pressure to sign a contract that was 
greatly disadvantageous to the community. This is what mainly marked the end of the 
relationship between both parties. In the case of the work with AIDER, the project allows for 
more control by the community. Every action done by AIDER is consulted with and approved by 
the Assembly. However, due to the high expectations they have in this second process, the 
comuneros tend not to question AIDER’s actions or proposals because the NGO has a good 
reputation and its experience is valued. However, the community would still have the power to 
question any action by the NGO – just as the community of Inferno does (which will be 
discussed in the next section of this chapter). 
None of the comuneros or authorities participate in broader discussions of REDD at the 
regional level in order to contribute to the construction of REDD or share their experiences. 
Members of the Council argue that Bélgica does not participate in the REDD+ Roundtable of 
Madre de Dios simply for being too far away from Puerto Maldonado, even though they have 
the time and resources to attend to the meetings that take place once every two months. There 
seems to be a lack of interest—whether intentional or not—in participating in these meetings 
with other communities, organizations, or public institutions involved in REDD. 
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Changes in Rules, Institutions and Practices 
Respondents agree that land and forest use have changed in the last few years and have 
become more severe since the arrival of REDD+. Ever since Bélgica was titled, several public and 
private organizations have made interventions aimed at the protection of the forests and the 
regulation of their use. Bélgica’s engagement timber harvesting was the first step in the change. 
Due to the increase of household’s income resulting from this activity, comuneros can afford a 
life with greater comfort. Thus, agriculture was gradually left behind and is only performed by a 
few comuneros and mostly for subsistence. With the arrival of timber certification, more 
restrictions over the extension of the farms were imposed and new management techniques 
were put into practice in an effort to keep as much of the standing forest as possible. New 
farms can only be made on forest fallow. Now, with the arrival of REDD+, the sizes of the farms 
do not exceed two hectares and slash-and-burn can only be done within a “fence” that will 
keep the fire enclosed in the area, avoiding its spread to the tall forest. Cattle ranching is said to 
be prohibited, however, according to some respondents, the number of cattle has increased 
and most of it belongs to the current president of the community.  
The logic behind this change in forest use to keep as much of the standing forest as 
possible is either for timber extraction or for carbon sequestration. The result is that, over time, 
the traditional use of the forest by the Bélgica community is in decline. During the interviews, 
community members mentioned the negative effects of slash and burn practices several times, 
especially because they release carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. Comuneros relate the idea 
of agriculture to environmental degradation – or at least it is present in their discourse.  
Preparation for REDD has also brought impressive changes in rules of social order. In 
July 2012, the Community Assembly approved the modification of the statute of the 
community. According to the authorities, the changes of the rules were suggested by the 
comuneros. Community members signed and finger-printed an individual written undertaking 
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by which they accept to be excluded from the register of inhabitants and to cease receiving 
income from the timber sales and REDD+. The text reads as follows: 
In the case that I fail to behave properly inside and outside the community and to 
provide labor and support for the good development of these two activities (certified 
timber extraction and REDD), I authorize the Assembly to exclude me from the register of 
inhabitants of this community and from receiving any type of income, either from timber 
sales or the REDD+ project. I will therefore peacefully accept this penalty and will not 
interpose any demand against the community (extracted from “Document of 
Commitment and Subjection” signed on July 20, 2012). 
However, due to the severity of the new rules, it appears that the comuneros instead have 
been induced or convinced to make the changes. 
As it has been detailed in Chapter 3 (in “Rules for Social Order”), proper behavior 
includes the respect of the rules for social order, such as attending and participating in the 
meetings, not drinking alcohol, and participating by providing labor for the community – which 
is also called “collective work” and includes cleaning the community, cleaning the road, 
repairing the community house, and any other activity that the authorities and the comuneros 
decide is beneficial for Bélgica as a whole.  
Alcohol consumption is considered to be an inappropriate behavior and a persistent 
problem. Comuneros mentioned that the use of alcohol was introduced when the community 
started receiving royalties. The issue has been discussed over the past few years in community 
meetings and some rules were agreed. For instance, a fine is deducted from the monthly salary 
of those who drink (approximately USD$20). With the aforementioned new rules, alcohol 
consumers will now be severely punished. All the comuneros agree with this rule because they 
have been informed that otherwise they will not meet the “social aspect” of the requirements 
for REDD+. Authorities argue that it is necessary to build trust in REDD+’s investors who need to 
be ensured that their investment will not negatively impact the community.   
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 Failing to “provide support” to the ongoing projects in the community is severely 
punished under the new statute, which entails drastic implications for citizenship and 
belonging. All comuneros have the responsibility of supporting the projects that have been 
approved by the Assembly; they must participate in the workshops, meetings, field work, and 
any type of work within the projects when required. There is no established minimum amount 
of time or labor for providing support, nor is the amount of support required to be given 
related to the amount of comuneros’ payments.  
 Comuneros are not permitted to be away from the community for more than two 
months without the permission of the Council; otherwise they will lose the benefits that they 
are entitled to as comuneros (both status and income). This rule goes against the Law of Native 
Communities of 1978,39 which established a maximum absence of twelve months unless the 
absentee demonstrates they are attending to school or present health problems.  In Bélgica, 
the return of former comuneros or the arrival of new ones is being restricted. In the past, new 
or returning people in the community would undergo a probation period of two years in order 
to acquire rights in the community, including status and income. Returning comuneros are still 
put on probation for two years, after which they can regain their status. However, the rule 
dealing with income has been abolished and now new or returning people cannot ever receive 
a salary. The existence of current royalties from the timber business and the possibility of 
future ones from REDD+ attracts the attention of outsiders who intend to move into Bélgica so 
that they can receive money.  People can no longer marry non-indigenous outsiders in order to 
reduce the likelihood of an outsider marrying comuneros only to access royalties from carbon 
and timber. There is no reference to a similar prohibition in the case of marrying indigenous 
outsiders.  
These new rules—and the attempt for imposing the permanent election of the current 
President—are ignored by the state authorities, NGOs, and the indigenous federations. These 
types of restrictions and impositions are not supported by any Peruvian law or the constitution; 
                                                          
39
 Law No. 22175 “Ley de Comunidades Nativas y de Desarrollo Agrario de la Selva y Ceja de Selva” 
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national laws state their respect for customary rules and guarantee that human rights are 
protected.  This may be the reason why these drastic and unusual rules are not included in the 
community statutes,40 but are rather stated in internal documents.  When questioned about 
the NGO’s knowledge of this situation, AIDER officers stated that it is their policy to respect 
customary rules of native communities and not to get involved in their internal decisions. They 
state that in the case that comuneros feel that rules are abusive, they should complain to the 
FENAMAD federation, the Vice Ministry of Intercultural Affairs, or the Ombudsman.   
Benefit sharing mechanisms to be adopted under REDD+ will be similar to the ones that 
are being used now for the distribution of timber royalties (as mentioned in Chapter 3). For 
almost three years, comuneros have been discussing REDD and the best way to benefit from its 
future revenue. They all want direct payments to complement their current salaries from 
timber. However, they also agree that some of the current rules for distribution of the benefits 
are under the influence of the subjectivity of the authorities, which allows the authorities and 
their relatives to monopolize the benefits.  
Infierno 
Consent: Understanding, Motivations and Expectations 
In Infierno, there are varying views in regards to REDD+. There is a group of supporters 
who get involved and participate in the meetings. These groups are comprised mostly of 
authorities and community members who (1) have landholdings with important extensions of 
well-preserved forest and (2) are interested in receiving extra income for the conservation of 
the areas under their care and are willing to wait a few years for the benefits to arrive. One 
other reason why they are interested in the project is because the preparatory activities include 
not only the diagnosis of the land rights in Infierno, but also the provision of technical 
assistance for completing the registration of their land title, which has been pending for so 
many years. According to one of the authorities who participated in the negotiations:  
                                                          
40
 Native communities’ statutes are registered in the National Public Registries.  
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We analyzed the offer very carefully and realized that even if we do not end up selling 
any carbon, at least the preparatory activities of the project will have secured our land. 
Comuneros understand that engaging in REDD+ can be a long process and that future payments 
are not one hundred percent guaranteed and, if they happen, payments will vary according to 
the price of the carbon in the market. Some optimistic supporters of the project hope that 
REDD+ income will improve their quality of life. But, the culmination of the titling process — 
which has been pending for so many years —is an extremely important issue for Infierno in the 
face of a recent migratory wave promoted by the construction of the Inter-Oceanic Highway. 
The opinion of an old Ese Eja leader illustrates this assertion: 
What caught my attention is that we will finally have our land title completely 
registered. We should have done this before, it has been nearly thirty years and all this 
time the authorities did not do anything....I’m not familiar with what AIDER is exactly 
doing as I have come just to 4 or 5 meetings so far. However, I am very pleased to know 
that AIDER is helping us in the measurement and border establishment of the territory. 
We need to increase surveillance of our borders because there are migrants who are 
establishing along the [Inter-Oceanic] Highway and are penetrating into our forest. 
In contrast, there is a small group of comuneros who oppose REDD+ because they either 
consider it would affect their business or because they are influenced by the indigenous 
federations discourse. The first group are the Papayeros, illegal loggers, and local merchants 
who dislike REDD+ because it requires a change in the “business as usual” way of using the 
forest. A local Andean merchant who is well known as an illegal logger in said:  
I ask myself if it is really worth it not to touch the forest while I wait on REDD’s money, 
missing the opportunity of getting some cash for crops and timber now? I have been 
observing this process and I see that in three years we have not achieved any (monetary) 
result. Our stomachs can’t wait any longer for REDD+. 
These changes will directly affect their livelihoods by imposing rules over the use of the 
resources and, therefore, this group does not believe in the potential benefits from REDD in the 
future. The second source of opposition is a group of community members who are 
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ideologically aligned to FENAMAD who criticize and oppose REDD+ directly, influenced by 
AIDESEP’s anti-REDD narratives. This is only a very small group of mostly Ese Eja leaders who 
disseminate this discourse in the community – and to their contacts outside the community--, 
especially during the phase of negotiation of entry. As it was aforementioned, FENAMAD did 
not gain any support when it tried to convince the population that the federation should be the 
project developer. Their position is not appreciated in Infierno. In the perspective of other 
groups of comuneros, the federations assume comuneros are not sufficiently empowered or 
lack the ability of negotiation. An important Ribereño leader who supports REDD reacts against 
this and explains:    
AIDESEP [the national indigenous federation] thinks that our community is in danger 
under REDD. But we have told them that it is safe, we would never sign any agreement 
that would jeopardize our [collective] land. In fact, the preparatory activities of the 
project are helping us achieve the last step towards clearing tenure, which is very 
convenient for Infierno so that we can protect the land. The federation thinks that we 
are silly or naïve, but we are not. We can make our own decisions based on a real 
evaluation of the opportunities that the projects present. We feel uncomfortable when 
others [FENAMAD and AIDESEP] think we are not capable enough to make smart 
decisions.   
According to this same leader, there are documents in the grey literature that talk about 
Infierno’s REDD project in negative ways, written by indigenous advocates. He adds:  
None of this people have visited the community once to ask us what we think about the 
project or how it is developing. All the information they get is from the people who 
oppose the project inside the community, who have their particular ideology. We know 
that the project has its flaws and that there are some bottlenecks and delays that we 
need to overcome, but definitively we are not being fooled. 
 
 Finally, there is a wide sector of the population that is still forming an opinion about 
REDD+ and, in general, is tired of the constant presence of NGOs and researchers.  As explained 
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by this staff member, most of the population is waiting for the project staff to visit them and to 
provide more information, just as was done in 1996 with RFE:  
 NGOs come to the community to work. AIDER talks about carbon sequestration, but few 
people, me included, understand what that means. The authorities meet with AIDER 
often, but they give us little information. It is always the same story and I don’t have 
time to listen a new NGO. NGOs usually present their projects; earn their salaries and 
leave. Very little stays in the community. I would probably be more interested if I saw 
that we can also benefit from the project money, like we do in Posada Amazonas. 
 
The benefit sharing mechanisms have not been agreed on yet, but they are being 
discussed to some extent.  Community members worry about the equity in the distribution of 
the benefits and the time it will take to receive REDD+ payments. For instance, a local merchant 
who is skeptical about REDD, asked: 
Imagine if some families decide not to cut trees and just use a little area for farming, 
while others don’t care that much and just clear most of their forest for commercial 
crops. Will these families receive the same share of benefits? I don’t think that is fair. 
How will the authorities know how much is being cut in each farm? 
Other community members believe that REDD should use the system they use in 
ecotourism: with a portion of the benefits going to a community fund and the other part going 
directly to the families. The authorities of the Council and the Control Committee have a 
different perspective and suggest that, during the first years, all REDD+ revenue should entirely 
go into a common pool to be invested in ecotourism activities in order to pay loans that they 
are currently applying to for the construction of a new lodge.   
Since there are no national laws for the regulation of benefit sharing arrangements, 
AIDER was supposed to design a proposal for benefit sharing in compliance with CCBA 
standards. This proposal was to be presented to the Council and the Assembly for their 
approval and further inclusion in the PDD (by the end of 2012). However, at the time of 
fieldwork, no information on this arrangement could be gathered.  
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The knowledge of and opinions on this intervention can be divided in two categories. 
One is the knowledge of and positions on REDD as a mechanism and the other has to do with 
the preparatory activities that will insert Infierno in REDD.  In regards to REDD, no matter what 
people’s position is, all the respondents are convinced that—to different degrees—they do not 
completely understand how REDD works, how the benefits will be distributed, or how will it be 
handled in the future. They agree that more information is needed and that project staff should 
visit every household in order to present the project – just like RFE did in 1996 in the 
ecotourism project. So far, knowledge is mostly concentrated in the hands of the local 
authorities, but even among them there are different degrees of understandings and positions. 
In regards to the preparatory activities, according to the project narrative, AIDER should 
periodically publish the progress and results of each one of the components on their website, 
make informative workshops in the community, and spread information through the media. 
The AIDER staff considers that opposition to the project has gradually faded thanks to the 
information that AIDER shares in the many workshops and meetings with the community. 
However, according to the majority of the respondents, the process by which comuneros are 
being informed continues to be weak and insufficient.  
Representation, Responsiveness and Accountability of the Authority 
During the negotiation of entry and the development of the preparatory project, the 
Infierno community was represented by the Community Council, with the support of the 
Control Committee and the advice of the Project Coordinator.  Decisions were made by the 
Assembly – as the main deliberative and decision making body of the community – and the 
Council acted on their behalf. However, the presence of the Ecotourism Project created a new 
level of representation and encouraged the specialization of members of the Control 
Committee in the supervision and management of projects. Thus, the Committee of Control is 
considered a new level of representation in the community for it represents 154 families that 
are members of the Ke’eway Association—out of a total of 180 families in Infierno—and is 
instrumental in the supervision and control of the activities and finances of the Ecotourism 
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Project.  In recent years, the Committee has joined the Council in negotiations with other 
entities. This has somehow legitimized the Committee as a representative body in the eyes of 
companies, NGOs, and the government. However, the Committee of Control cannot be 
considered a democratically representative body since their members are self-appointed, 
represent particular interests, and are accountable only to the members of the Ke’eway 
Association. 
In Infierno, authorities of the Council are accountable to all community members and 
respond for their own actions in public meetings. Authorities are elected with the vote of the 
Assembly in public elections. In regards to different affairs, decisions are also made based on 
the deliberations of the Assembly in public meetings; the authorities accept people’s mandate 
and make efforts to translate people’s demands into actions. Authorities are expected to report 
of all their activities and expenses to the Assembly, who holds them accountable. The Assembly 
has the power to dismiss and punish authorities who do not work or behave according to the 
community rules. Despite disagreement in some aspects of local governance, most of the 
respondents agreed that the authorities mostly respect what the people decide in the 
Assembly. Although not completely perfect, representation in Infierno is democratic.  
Different from the Ecotourism Project, REDD+’s arrival has not yet promoted the 
creation of new representative institutions. The Committee of Control is currently learning 
about REDD+ to engage in the supervision of REDD+ along with a group of two people 
designated by the Assembly, who will be trained in carbon markets and carbon credits 
negotiation. 
Participation and Control of the Process 
In regards to REDD+ activities, coordination between Infierno’s authorities and AIDER is 
constant. In July 2012, as a result of some bottlenecks in several project activities and the 
widespread criticism that the project is facing due to the lack of visible results, the members of 
the Council, Control Committee, and the Project Coordinator met with AIDER. Three main 
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concerns were discussed: infrastructure, budget, and the dissemination of information about 
REDD. Comuneros perceive that the project does not allow for their active participation, as the 
project is designed in such way that they remain passive recipients of information and training 
about REDD+ in general. Their experience with RFE has taught them that active participation 
yields better results and to the ownership of the project, so they are very critical of the way the 
Project Developer is conducting the project.  
Attendance at the REDD+ meetings is low. Project staff argues that this is because 
people are busy in the lodge, are working in their farms, or are in the city. However, these 
might not be the only reasons that attendance is low, for it contrasts with the massive 
attendance of comuneros at the meetings where the progress of Posada is discussed. 
Comuneros argue that in the beginning of the ecotourism project, participation was low too 
and convincing the people to join the project was a difficult process. They also argue that, in the 
case of the REDD+ project, the results are not visible, which raises doubts about their future 
success.   
 One reason for the low level of participation may have to do with the fact that local 
labor for project activities is not included in the budget. Therefore, the possibilities of the local 
people to obtain some benefit are inexistent, thus having an impact on their interest in the 
project.  Some community members have expressed their discomfort in regards to the 
percentage of the budget that goes into covering salaries and consultancies of outsiders – 
especially considering that local people are well suited to provide labor. This situation has been 
discussed in meetings between representatives of the community and AIDER, but at the time of 
the study, the negotiations had not yielded any result.  
Changes in Rules, Institutions and Practices 
Infierno has been under a constant process of production and modification of rules in 
regards to forest use. This is not any different at the arrival of the REDD+. The communal 
territory is divided into a common use area and an area for farms (which vary in size, and can 
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range from thirty hectares in the case of old members, to approximately fifteen hectares for 
new community members). Land allocation rules are changing because of the pressure over 
land resulting from the increase of the population and also because of the need to reduce 
deforestation in the community lands.  
According to the new rule brought by REDD+, comuneros are now only allowed to clear 
up to ten hectares of forest within their farms. This does not seem a problem for subsistence 
farmers (who on average do not work more than four hectares of land in a year). However, it 
does represent a problem to those who use larger extensions for market-oriented agriculture, 
like the papaya tenant farmers and those who illegally extract high value timber species to be 
sold on the black market.  
The papaya tenant farmers are resisting this new rule because it directly affects their 
business. Their strategy is to couple efforts with a group of new and young comuneros who are 
being given land behind the plots located along the river. These new comuneros argue that 
access to these new plots is difficult; therefore, they demand the construction of a road. This 
road will provide them with easy access to get their produce to the market. This will also be 
beneficial to the papayeros who will have new infrastructure to expand their business and to 
rent more land from people who prefer to earn their livelihood in the city or the lodge. Up until 
the end of fieldwork, the authorities were making efforts to convince the Assembly that a road 
will signify the increase of deforestation and an enormous threat to their ecotourism business 
and payments from REDD+. Papayeros, illegal loggers, and charcoal producers try to convince 
their relatives and the Assembly that the long term benefits from REDD may never arrive.    
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS 
The cases presented in this thesis illustrate the process of arrival of preparatory REDD+ 
activities and the changes they have been bringing to two indigenous communities with 
different histories, ethnic compositions, and governance experiences, but similar in how both 
are engaged with certain level of success in activities that rely on the use of forest resources. 
Due to the differences in governance experiences, REDD+ projects in these two distinct sites 
produce different outcomes even though they have been carried out by the same Project 
Developer, in the same region, under the same laws.  
Titling and additional economic benefits are two distinct reasons that Infierno and 
Bélgica decided to engage in REDD+.  In the case of Infierno, obtaining land tenure is only one 
of the components of the project, but it seems to be the most important, even more so than 
future payments from REDD. In this case, all the respondents without exception still have 
doubts about whether REDD+ will result in an improvement in their economic situations or the 
use of the forest. REDD+ supporters agree that clearing tenure is the main benefit of the 
preparatory project, even if REDD+ does not work in the future. In the case of Bélgica, land 
tenure is not a worry. Community members are interested in REDD+ because of the revenues 
that will complement the income they obtain form certified timber sales. All comuneros are 
very optimistic that they will soon engage in REDD+ and sell carbon credits that will provide 
direct payments to the families. They expect that the payments will help improve household’s 
economies, as well as the community’s infrastructure – such as and health and education 
services. 
Bélgica and Infierno present important differences in the way local people make 
decisions and participate in REDD+. In the case of Bélgica, decision making continues to be 
influenced by the ruling authorities for they concentrate knowledge, power, and resources in 
order to convince the community to support REDD+ or any activity they consider convenient. 
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Even though the community members participate in discussion forums, their decisions are 
based on information provided by the authorities. Therefore, most of the decisions made are 
aligned to the authorities’ preferences. In addition, recently created community rules state 
comuneros can lose membership in the community if they do not provide support to 
community projects, so there is little space and information for opposing REDD+ or any other 
initiative supported by the authorities. This study also reveals patterns of inequality in access to 
revenues and labor opportunities. In Bélgica, not all the comuneros equally benefit from 
projects or businesses. There are scales of payment according to the status and gender of the 
community member, which ends up excluding women and not benefitting those who are not 
directly related to the ruling authorities or hold public office. REDD+ runs the risk of 
reproducing inequality since the same benefit sharing system that is used for timber revenues 
will be used for REDD+.   
In Infierno, the arrival of REDD+ has not changed the way decisions are made in the 
community. Even though knowledge about REDD+ is also concentrated in the hands of a few 
people in the Council, the Control Committee, and the Project Coordinator, comuneros have 
the power to demand from these authorities that the information reaches all community 
members. Since the foundation of the community (and only more so with the influence of an 
Ecotourism Project in their area), the decision making process has been based in long and 
detailed discussions among the three ethnic groups living in the community. People can be very 
critical and demand in-depth explanations from their authorities and the REDD project NGO, 
AIDER. Through their representative authorities, comuneros also demanded that the NGO visit 
each household in order to provide thorough information about the project. In addition, the 
community was starting to discuss the possible benefit sharing mechanism to be employed for 
REDD+. According to most of the respondents, they were considering using the same 
mechanism that is being used in the Ecotourism Project, but to extend it to all community 
members.  The process of development of the preparatory project was based on constant 
negotiations and exchanges between Infierno and AIDER (the NGO). The community managed 
to participate and impose their conditions.  
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The present study also reveals the lack of involvement of the District Municipalities—the 
most local level of government—and the regional governments in the process of REDD+’s 
preparatory projects. Even though they are elected and represent native communities in their 
jurisdictions, District Municipalities lack the powers and wherewithal to rule over forests and 
land use, so they really do not attend to communities’ needs in these matters. Such 
responsibilities lie in the hands of the Regional Governments, which are entitled to issue land 
titles to native communities and give extraction permits and concessions over forest resources. 
However, this level of government does not have specific jurisdiction in regards to REDD+. 
Therefore, communities directly engage in pilot REDD+ projects that are represented by 
communal authorities who act as intermediaries between the populations and the NGOs or 
private companies. In addition, the regional indigenous federation (FENAMAD) is excluded from 
the process due to its anti-REDD discourse. Lack of representation for REDD+ on behalf of 
different levels of the State and the indigenous federation entails risks to communities as they 
are not backed by elected and customary authorities that can make sure that communities go 
through adequate processes for sharing information and gaining consent, that their rights are 
respected, and that equitable benefits sharing mechanisms are designed and implemented. 
Otherwise, REDD+ would only reinforce exclusion and inequality.  
At the community level, forms of representation in both Bélgica and Infierno are similar 
in structure, but different in how democratic they are. Both communities have a Council that 
represents the community, and a Community Assembly that acts as the main deliberative and 
decision making body. Following the concept of “democratic representation,” this investigation 
revealed that Bélgica’s regime is not democratic. Even though decisions are made by the 
Assembly in an apparently democratic process, they are heavily influenced by the ruling 
authorities and the Facilitator – who monopolize knowledge and resources and impose 
pressure through the creation of severe rules for social control. Moreover, authorities of the 
Council are not accountable to the people as they do not completely report their activities or 
their management of funds and resources of the community. The advent of REDD+ in this 
community, under these conditions, is likely to perpetuate elite domination, inequality, and 
94 
 
exclusion of vulnerable and powerless groups. In the case of Infierno, representation is 
democratic as the Council acts on behalf of the community members and puts in practice 
people’s mandates as agreed in community meetings. There are mechanisms of accountability 
that guarantee that the authorities report back to the Assembly about their activities and the 
management of community’s funds and resources. The Assembly has enough power to sanction 
those authorities that are not working according to their mandates.  
Both Bélgica and Infierno have experienced changes in rules and institutions at the 
advent of REDD+. In the case of Bélgica, agricultural activities were already being controlled 
because they previously obtained timber certification with the aim of keeping as much standing 
forest as possible. Upon the arrival of REDD+, restrictions were extended over the rules for 
social order. Rules for becoming community members or for losing that status are becoming 
extremely uncompromising. Comuneros can be removed from the community and lose their 
right to certified timber and REDD+ revenues if they fail to support project activities or if they 
show “improper behavior.” Comuneros have been induced to sign written affidavits in which 
they give up their rights to complain in case they are dismissed from the community. The 
decision for what is “support” and what is “improper behavior” are made by the ruling 
authorities based on their own subjectivities. The threat of losing membership to the 
community under these conditions constitutes a human rights abuse. In the case of Infierno, 
changes in the rules have not been as severe as in Bélgica. According to the new rules by 
REDD+, community members cannot cut more than ten hectares of land in their plots as a 
measure to prevent deforestation and degradation. New land allocations are smaller than in 
the past, not only because of REDD+, but also because of population growth and the less 
available land—), which has been reduced from thirty to fifteen hectares. New rules have been 
accepted by the collectivity without conflicts, except with those who use larger areas for 
market-oriented agriculture, like the papaya tenant farmers and illegal lumberjacks. 
The cases of Bélgica and Infierno are useful for illustrating the conditions under which 
REDD+ projects are taking place in native communities in Peru. Communities are at great risk 
95 
 
because that private companies and organizations do not have the obligation of consulting the 
population if they wish to start REDD+ projects in native communities. Risk is enhanced by the 
lack of supervision from the different levels of government during the processes by which 
populations are informed and provide consent. Implementing organizations may overlook 
governance issues at the community level that lead to abuse and exploitation of people in 
communities who may end up losing important assets and freedoms. The development and 
implementation of social protections is essential for avoiding potential negative effects in 
populations, as well as to ensure the generation of benefits for them. 
When this research took place, communities had not yet received completion for the 
feasibility stage, which is the culmination and validation of the Project Document Design, . In 
order to continue analyzing the effects of REDD+ in these communities, it would be relevant to 
study participation and representation during the implementation phase, when communities 
are finally able to generate carbon credits and are enabled to be monitored further and for 
credit certification sessions.  
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APPENDIX A 
Map of the location of parcels assigned to each family in the Native Community of Infierno.  
The river flows in direction to the NE (from Hermosa Grande to Cascajal.) On the right margin 
we find (what used to be) Hermosa Grande, Posada Amazonas, Hermosa Chica, Centro Ñape 
and the Tambopata National Reserve.  On the left margin, we find Puerto Vicente (which is a 
boat deck with only a few houses around), CNI (which is is an acronym for “Comunidad Nativa 
Infierno”), Puerto Nuevo, and Cascajal. The area within the rectangle of the community that is 
not part of the family parcels is considered “Common Forest Area” and is managed under 
specific rules.  
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APPENDIX B 
Map of Bélgica Community and surrounding forest concessions. 
 
Source: Brotto (2009). 
 
